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SURVEY OF CIVIL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN
COUNTRY 1990
Sandra Hansen, Esq.*
L The Origins of Tribal Sovereignty
A. Introduction1
Long before their contact with European nations, most Indian
* Attorney, Wlhiteing & Thompson, Boulder, Colorado. Ms. Hansen was assisted
in the section dealing with water rights by Dale T. White, Esq., Special Assistant to the
Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs, United States Department of the Interior. Professor
Ralph W. Johnson of the University of Washington School of Law and Jeanne S.
Whiteing, a partner in Whiteing & Thompson, served as legal scholars/consultants in the
preparation of this survey. In that capacity, they provided valuable comments, suggestions,
and contributions. Nevertheless, Ms. Hansen is completely responsible for any errors or
omissions in the survey.
This survey was prepared by the Institute for Court Management of the National
Center for State Courts, in conjunction with the Civil Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts and
State Courts: Research and Leadership Consensus Building Project, which is administered
by the National Center for State Courts, sponsored by the Conference of Chief Justices
of State Supreme Courts, and funded by the State Justice Institute. The Project's goals
are to clarify civil jurisdictional concerns between tribal and state courts and to develop
strategies for resolving jurisdictional disputes between these two sovereigns.
This survey of literature, caselaw, and statutes is intended to summarize the existing
law governing jurisdiction over civil actions that arise in Indian Country. The survey
should assist tribal and state court judges in determining the extent and limits of their
jurisdiction over civil actions arising in Indian Country.
The lav governing civil jurisdiction in Alaska and Oklahoma differs somewhat from
the law in other states. Persons in those states are encouraged to refer to the 1982 edition
of Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law for a detailed study of the unique
law applicable in Alaska and in Oklahoma. The Handbook is the leading treatise in the
field of Indian law and other researchers should consult the work for a more complete
discussion of the concepts presented in this survey. Other valuable sources include W.
Canby's American Indian Law (West Nutshell Series 1989) and C. Wilkinson's American
Indians, Time & the Law (Yale University Press 1987).
The Coordinating Council that guides this Project requested that citations to tribal
authority be included to support the propositions included in the survey. Unfortunately,
time and financial resources prohibited the authors from implementing the suggestion to
the extent desired. Many tribal codes are not annotated. There are even fewer digests.
The Navajo nation is one exception: the tribal code is annotated and a digest is available
from DNA People's Legal Services in Window Rock, Arizona. For that reason, most
citations to tribal laws in this survey are to Navajo law. A caveat: laws differ from tribe
to tribe, just as they do from state to state. When a question of tribal/state jurisdiction
arises, reference should always be made to the law of the particular tribe concerned.
This research was conducted under Grant No. 88-14L-B-037 from the State Justice
Institute to the National Center for State Courts. The opinions and recommendations
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the grantor
or grantee.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
320 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
tribes were independent, self-governing societies. 2 The degree of
organization varied from the League of the Iroquois, a confed-
eration of tribes with a population between 10,000 and 17,000,1
to the entities of the Pacific Northwest, where the basic political
unilt consisted of family groups or clans. 4 Typically, tribal policy
on major issues such as war and foreign affairs was developed
by consensus,- often at general council meetings which were
open to all adult members in many tribes. 6
While historically most tribes had no written laws,7 individual
behavior was guided by norms of conduct that evolved as custom.
These precepts were normally enforced through peer pressure in
the form of mockery, ostracism, ridicule, and religious sanctions. 8
The Indians' system of justice also demanded restitution from
wrongdoers; 9 thus, many tribes required that a wrongdoer com-
pensate the injured party's family. 10 Some tribes imposed addi-
tional sanctions, including corporal punishment such as whipping
or even death for serious crimes such as murder, theft, and
rape."
1. Much of this section is taken from F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 229-32 (1982 ed.).
2. See generally H. DIVER, INDIANs OF NORTH AMERICA 287-308 (1969); K. LLaw-
EuYnta & E. HOWBBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941).
3. See, e.g., H. DIVER, supra note 2, at 302; A. DEBo, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS
OF THE UNITED STATES 9, 13 (1970); L. MOROAN, LEAGUE OF TE Ho-DE'-No-SAu-NEE
OR IROQUOIS (1954). The League of the Iroquois is one federal system that served as a
model in the development of the United States' constitutional framework. See, e.g.,
Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REV. 145, 183 (1940); Russell,
The Influence of Indian Confederations on the Union of the American Colonies, 22 J.
Am. HIST. 53 (1928).
4. See, e.g., H. DRIVER, supra note 2, at 298-302.
5. Tso, The Tribal Court Survives in America, JUDGES' J., Spring 1986, at 22,
24.
6. See H. DRIVER, supra note 2, at 302; W. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA
40-51 (1975).
7. A few tribes did develop formal court systems without direct influence from the
European nations. See J. NooN, LAW AND Gov-RqmurENr OF THE GRN RIVER IROQUOIS
(1949); R. SRICKI.AND, FIRE AND THE SPRT (1975).
8. See J. REID, A BETTrER KIND OF HATCHET 10-12 (1976); W. WASHBuRN, supra
note 6, at 42-51.
9. Tso, supra note 5, at 24.
10. See, e.g., G. HYDE, SPOTTED TAm's FoLx: A HISTORY OF Tim BRULE Sioux 152,
307 (1961); D. McNIc.LE, THEY CAmE HERE Fmsr 52-65 (1975); W. NVAsHnuRN, supra
note 6, at 40-51.
11. See, e.g., D. McNIcnE, supra note 10, at 52-65; W. WAsHBuRN, supra note 6,
at 40-42.
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B. Retained Tribal Sovereignty2
When the tribes began their relationship with the federal gov-
ernment, they possessed all of the sovereign powers of inde-
pendent nations. After the tribes came under the authority of
the United States, certain limitations upon the external powers
of tribal self-government necessarily followed. 13 From the begin-
ning the United States permitted, then protected, the tribes in
their continued self-government.' 4 In three opinions written be-
tween 1823 and 1832,15 Chief Justice John Marshall articulated
the concepts and principles that have defined the legal status of
Indian tribes to this day.
First, the Marshall Court established that the Constitution
delegated paramount authority over Indian matters to the federal
government.16 Thus, federal treaties with Indian tribes and sta-
tutes regulating Indian matters prevail over state laws. 7 This rule
on allocation of power has been consistently followed.'5
Second, the Marshall Court described the tribes' status in
relation to the United States as a dependent one, based on the
12. Much of this section is taken from F. CoHEN, supra note 1, at 122-50, and
Collins, Implied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WAsH. L. REv. 479,
480-84 (1979).
13. In Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), Chief Justice Marshall
concluded that "discovery" by the European nations prohibited the tribes from selling
their land without the approval of the new sovereign. Id. at 574. In Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), the Chief Justice noted that tribes may not make
treaties or establish political connections with nations other than the United States. Id.
at 17. Other early decisions alluded to the inability of tribes to enter into direct commercial
relations with foreign nations. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring).
14. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978). See also McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168-74 (1973); Quiver v. United States, 241
U.S. 602, 603-06 (1916); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896); Ex parte Crow
Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 558-70 (1883); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 755 (1869);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556, 560-62 (1832).
15. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
16. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. As the Court stated, the previous allocation
of authority had been uncertain because of ambiguous wording in the Articles of
Confederation.
17. The Supreme Court has never held a federal Indian statute or treaty to be an
invasion of state authority, and on several occasions the Court reversed contrary holdings
of lower courts. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
18. Modem decisions of the Court hold that the federal power over commerce with
the Indian tribes, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the treaty power, U.S. CoNST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2, are the most important sources of federal authority over Indian affairs.
See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 554 (1975); McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172
n.7.
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common treaty provision that the tribe placed itself under United
States protection "and of no other sovereign whatsoever."' 19 This
dependency has several important consequences. The Court held
that the general practice of European sovereigns to exercise
dominion over land acquired from the Indian tribes had been
absorbed into federal law.20 Under this rule, the tribes' use and
occupancy of their lands is respected, but they may not sell their
lands to anyone except those acting under authority of the federal
government. 21 The same dependent relationship authorized Con-
gress to legislate broadly concerning the Indians.? However,
Congress' broad authority over Indian affairs was described as
imposing on the federal government the duty of protecting the
Indians and their property.23
Third, the Marshall Court concluded that the parties to the
early Indian treaties intended that the tribes would retain self-
government within the territory reserved to them, subject only
to federal authority?2 In reaching this conclusion, Marshall relied
on the express terms of treaties, the general course of federal
legislation and Indian treaties, and the principle of international
law that the internal law of conquered or protectorate territory
remains in force until affirmatively superseded by the new sov-
ereign.25 This doctrine has subsequently been applied to tribal
lands set aside by unilateral federal action as well. 26
Fourth, the Marshall Court construed Indian treaties and fed-
eral statutes in favor of federal protection for and self-govern-
19. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 551-52, 555 (quoting one of the Cherokee treaties).
Later treaties included language acknowledging the tribe's "dependence on the government
of the United States." See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 207 (1978)
(quoting from a treaty with the Suquamish Tribe). In other treaties, the tribes acknowledge
the "supremacy" of the United States. See, e.g., Treaty with the Cheyenne Tribe, July
6, 11125, art. 1, 7 Stat. 255. Some treaties included no such terms. See Treaty with the
Wyandot and Other Indian Tribes, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49 (Treaty of Greeneville).
20. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835); Johnson v. McIntosh,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584-88 (1823).
21. Since 1790, this principle has been codified in successive statutes commonly
knovm as the Nonintercourse Acts. The present version is codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177
(1988).
22. This principle is implicit in much of Marshall's language, particularly in Worces-
ter, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561, and later decisions depended on it directly. See Delaware
Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886).
23. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 551-52, 556.
24. Id. at 560-61.
25. Id.
26. Both Congress and the executive have treated tribal self-government in Indian
Country without any distinctions based on the manner in which lands were set aside.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1162 (1988); 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n, 461-479, 1301-1326 (1988);
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988).
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ment by the tribes.27 From this principle several closely related
canons of construction have evolved governing the interpretation
of federal laws and treaties respecting Indian matters. Treaties
and other bilateral agreements are to be interpreted as the Indians
would have understood them.2s Ambiguities or doubts about the
meaning of statutory or treaty provisions are to be resolved in
the Indians' favor.29 Treaties and federal Indian statutes are to
be interpreted in favor of retained tribal self-government as
opposed to competing federal or state authority. 0 Federal Indian
laws are to be interpreted liberally so as to effectuate their
protective purpose.31
A fifth principle, not specifically articulated by Marshall, was
developed in later cases: the reservation to tribes of federally
protected territory is intended for the Indians' economic self-
support as well as their continued self-government. The fish,
game, timber, minerals, waters, and other resources are implicitly
reserved with the land itself to provide a productive economic
base for the Indians.32
From the Cherokee Cases evolved perhaps the most basic
principle of federal Indian law: those powers which are lawfully
vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers
granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers
27. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 551-52, 555-56, 560-62, 582.
28. Id. at 515, 551-54. See also Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-
31 (1970); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905); Jones v. Meehan, 175
U.S. 1, 11 (1899).
29. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); Antoine v. Washington,
420 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1975); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,
174-76 (1973); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v.
United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77
(1908).
30. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Nation, 439 U.S.
463, 484 (1979); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62-72 (1978); Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1976); McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174-75; United
States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 604-06 (1916); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-
72 (1883).
31. Antoine, 420 U.S. at 200; Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504-05 (1973); Tulee
v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 366-67
(1930); Smith v. McCullough, 270 U.S. 456, 463-65 (1926).
32. The Court in Worcester emphasized the Indians have "full right" to their lands.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560-61. In Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711
(1835), the Court stated that the Indians' "right of occupancy is considered as sacred as
the fee simple of the whites." Id. at 746. Later cases of importance include Menominee
Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S.
111 (1938); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918); Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished. 33 The
Supreme Court has held that "Indian tribes still possess those
aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status. '3 4
This principle guides determinations of the scope of tribal au-
thority. Today, the tradition of tribal sovereignty furnishes the
backdrop against which all federal Indian laws are to be read. 5
II. Indian Country
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is a
significant geographic component to tribal sovereignty. 6 Indian
tribes have long been held to have "attributes of sovereignty
over both their members and their territory. ' 37 Conversely, "ab-
sent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond
reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to non-
discriminatory state laws otherwise applicable to all citizens of
the State.' '38
While most people are familiar with the term "Indian reser-
vation," for most jurisdictional purposes, the operative legal
term is "Indian Country." "Indian Country" is defined in 18
U.S.C. § 1151 as
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation
under the jurisdiction of the United States Government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, in-
cluding rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the board-
ers [sic] of the United States whether within or without
the limits of a State, and (c) all Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, in-
cluding rights-of-way running through the same. 39
Although the definition of "Indian Country" appears in the
section of the United States Code governing federal criminal laws
33. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978); 55 Interior Dec. 14, 20-
30 (and cases cited therein) (1934).
34. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323; Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
208-09 (1978). See also 55 Interior Dec. 14, 20-30 (and cases cited therein) (1934).
35. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1973).
36. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 14245 (1980).
37. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142; United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
See also Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56
(1978).
38. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
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applicable to Indian Country, the Supreme Court has stated that
the statute's definition generally applies also to questions of civil
jurisdiction.4°
While the "Indian Country" statute appears to be straight-
forward, there have been numerous actions focusing on whether
specific conduct occurred on land subject to federal, state, or
tribal jurisdiction. 41
III. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
A. In State or Federal Court
The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that neither the
United States nor any state may be sued without its consent. 42
The Supreme Court has held that Indian tribes enjoy sovereign
immunity from suit in state or federal court, in much the same
manner as the United States. 43
Tribal sovereign immunity can be waived by Congress, 44 but
such waivers must be clearly expressed 45 and are to be strictly
construed. 6 Congress has not enacted a broad-based waiver of
tribal sovereign immunity like that passed by the United States
40. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975). See also
Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 837-38 (1982); Bracker,
448 U.S. at 142-45.
41. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kfieip, 430
U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975); United States
v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357 (1933).
42. See United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 288 (1846) (immunity
of the federal government) (finding that a federal circuit court had no jurisdiction to
hear an equity action against the United States because "government is not liable to be
sued, except with its own consent, given by law."); Black v. Republic, 1 Yeates 139 (Pa.
1792) (immunity of the states) (finding that the court lacked jurisdiction over an action
against the commonwealth without its consent). The rules established by these, and
similar, early cases developed as a tacit assumption rather than as a reasoned doctrine.
For a summary of the development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see Johnson
& Madden, Sovereign Immunity in Indian Tribal Law, 12 AM. INDiAN L. Ray. 153
(1987).
43. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978); Puyallup Tribe,
Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977); United States v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940).
44. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58; Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152, 158-59 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972).
45. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58. See also Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
Cf. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976) (congressional waivers of the United
States' immunity may not be broadened by implication); United States v. King, 395 U.S.
1 (1969) (same).
46. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 918 (1966).
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concerning monetary claims 47 and the actions of administrative
officials. 48 Those states which have enacted similar laws aban-
doning their own sovereign immunity must nevertheless honor
the tribes' immunity.49 Sovereign immunity seems to run with
the tribes, not with tribal land, so sovereign immunity may apply
even though an incident, such as an alleged tort or contract
breach, occurs off-reservation. °
Tribal sovereign immunity may not prevent a federal court
from hearing a case when the plaintiff requests injunctive or
declaratory relief against individual tribal officials who allegedly
acted outside the scope of their authority. The rule, an outgrowth
of Ex Parte Young,-5 which involved federal sovereign immunity,
is based upon the concept that a suit against officers engaging
in illegal conduct is not a suit against the tribe itself. Thus, in
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washington,2
the Supreme Court upheld orders against tribal officials in a
fishing rights case, holding that "whether or not the tribe itself
may be sued in a state court without its consent or that of
Congress, a suit to enjoin violations of state law by individual
tribal members is permissible. '53 However, in the special case of
enforcing the provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)14
which imposed some of the restrictions of the Bill of Rights
upon the tribes,5 5 the Supreme Court has found that Congress
did not intend to create a federal cause of action against tribal
47. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988); Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1988).
48. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703 (1988).
49. See Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe, 103 Ariz. 425, 428, 443 P.2d 421,
424 (1968).
50. Id.
51. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
52. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
53. Id. at 171.
54. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988).
55. The ICRA differs from the Bill of Rights because it does not include a provision
comparable to the establishment clause of the first amendment. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1)
(198.3). Nor does it provide a right to a grand jury indictment or counsel except at the
defendant's own expense. See id. § 1302(6). Only a six-person grand jury is required.
See id. § 1302(10). Criminal penalties imposed by tribal courts are limited to confinement
for one year and a five thousand dollar fine. See id. § 1302(7).
Even where the "Indian bill of rights" contains language similar to that of the Bill of
Rights, the protections afforded by the ICRA are not necessarily coextensive with the
rights guaranteed by the latter. See Stands Over Bull v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 442
F. Supp. 360, 367 (D. Mont. 1977), appeal dismissed, 578 F.2d 799, 799-800 (9th Cir.
1978); Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143, 1150 (D.S.D. 1974), remanded on other
grounds, 521 F.2d 724, 729-30 (8th Cir. 1975).
326
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss2/3
SURVEY OF CIVIL JURISDICTION
officials. An exception to that principle is the writ of habeas
corpus testing the validity of the detention of any person in a
tribe's custody.5 6
One question that has not been directly addressed by the
Supreme Court is whether congressional approval is required to
support a tribe's waiver of its sovereign immunity in federal or
state court. In United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.,57 the Court wrote only in terms of congressional action. In
Puyallup Tribe8 the Court referred loosely to either tribal or
congressional consent. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez5 9 the
Court seemed to require an "unequivocal expression" by Con-
gress. Later, in holding that North Dakota could not condition
a tribe's right to sue on the tribe's waiver of all sovereign
immunity, the Court did not question the fact that the tribe had
the power to waive its immunity ° Lower courts have now
accepted the view that a tribe can waive its immunity if the tribe
does so unequivocally. 61
The Supreme Court has recognized the general right of tribes
to sue in state and federal courts without the presence of the
United States as a party.62 By bringing an action in court, a tribe
necessarily consents to a full adjudication of the claim sued
upon63 and to claims of recoupment or set-off that arise from
the transaction in controversy and do not exceed the tribe's
claim. 64 However, by bringing an action, the tribe does not waive
its immunity from counterclaims, even "compulsory" ones. 65
Tribes cannot waive their sovereign immunity in matters af-
fecting trust property without secretarial or congressional ap-
proval. 6 Similarly, restricted property cannot be taken to satisfy
a judgment without congressional authority. 67
56. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 67 (1978).
57. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
58. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
59. 436 U.S. 459 (1978).
60. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation v. Wold Eng'g,
476 U.S. 877 (1986).
61. See Weeks Constr. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1986);
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds,
455 U.S. 130 (1982); Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977).
62. See Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 370-71 (1968); Creek Nation
v. United States, 318 U.S. 629, 640 (1943).
63. See United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1981).
64. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1343-46 (10th Cir. 1982).
65. See Wichita & Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 773-74 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1343-46 (10th Cir. 1982).
66. 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1988).
67. See Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 440-42 (1912).
No. 2]
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B. In Tribal Court
Congress limited the power of tribal governments in 1968 when
Congress enacted the ICRA. 8 The ICRA applies some of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights to Indian tribes, including the
equal protection and due process clauses.6 9 The Supreme Court
has held that the ICRA does not waive a tribe's immunity as to
federal civil actions for injunctive or declaratory relief to redress
violations of the Act, except in habeas corpus actions.70 After
Martinez, the principal forum available to a party aggrieved by
tribal government action is tribal court.
As sovereign governments, tribes may adopt or reject sovereign
immunity or may create waivers to immunity as to actions filed
in tribal court. No federal law requires a particular result. The
choice is up to each tribe.
Some tribes have chosen to address sovereign immunity in
tribal constitutions, 71 while others have dealt with soverign im-
munity in legislation.72 Still other tribes have left the immunity
issue to their courts. Tribal courts tend to apply the doctrine of
sovereign immunity as provided by the tribal code73 or as an
68. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-701, 82 Stat. 73, 77-81 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
1301-1.341 (1988)).
69. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
70. Se-e Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59, 61 (1978).
71. E.g., MENOMDNE CoNsT. art. XVIII, § I ("[tihe Tribal Legislature shall not
waive or limit the right of the Menominee Indian Tribe to be immune from suit except
as authorized by this Article and by Article XII of this Constitution").
72. E.g., NAvAJo Tarn. CODE tit. 7, § 257 (Supp. 1984-1985) (prohibiting the district
courts of the Navajo Nation from exercising jurisdiction over any action against the
Navajo Nation without its express consent); NAvAJo TAM. CODE tit. 1, §§ 354-355 (Supp.
1984-1985) (waiving the sovereign immunity of the Navajo Nation under certain circum-
stances). See also Cudmore v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council, 10 Indian L. Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6004, 6005 (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Ct. 1981)
(finding a waiver of immunity in a code section providing that "no security shall be
required of ... [the] Tribe, or of its officers or agency" when a restraining order is
issued against it. The court said this language waived immunity in injunction actions
because such a clause would otherwise be unnecessary.).
73. See George v. Colville Tribes Business Council, CV-84-402 (Colville Tribal Ct.
1984); Stone v. Somday, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6039
(Colville Tribal Ct. 1983); Miller v. Adams, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 6034 (Intertribal Ct. App. 1982); Cudmore v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal
Council, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6004 (Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribal Ct. 1981); Chapoose v. Uintah & Ouray Tribal Business Comm., Civ. No.
133-177 (Ute Indian Tribes of Uintah & Ouray Reservation Tribal App. Ct., opinion on
reh'g Nov. 23, 1981); Burnette v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, I Tribal Ct. Rep. A-51 (Rosebud
Sioux Tribal Ct. 1978).
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interpretation of common law.74 At least one tribal court has
rejected the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a defense.75 Most
tribal courts have found that the ICRA waives the tribe's im-
munity from suit as to actions in tribal court alleging a violation
of the Act.7 6
Where a tribal code is silent as to the issue of sovereign
immunity, a waiver may be found in other tribal documents. At
least two tribal courts have found waivers of sovereign immunity
in the tribes' personnel manuals.77 Another tribal court found a
waiver of sovereign immunity in an insurance policy.7 8
As to suits against tribal officials, most tribal courts that rely
on the common law, as opposed to a tribal code provision,
74. See Garman v. Fort Belknap Community Council, 11 Indian L. Rep. (Am.
Indian Law. Training Program) 6017 (Ft. Belknap Tribal Ct. 1984); Satiacum v. Sterud,
10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6013 (Puyallup Tribal Ct. 1982);
Holy Rock v. Tribal Election Bd., 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
6009 (Oglala Sioux Tribal Ct. 1982); Grant v. Grievance Comm. of Sac & Fox, 2 Tribal
Ct. Rep. A-39 (Sac & Fox Tribal Ct. 1981); Kiowa Business Comm. v. Ware, 2 Tribal
Ct. Rep. A-45 (Kiowa Tribal Ct. of Indian Off. 1980); Halona v. MacDonald, 2 Tribal
Ct. Rep. A-70 (Navajo Sup. Ct. 1978).
75. O'Brien v. Fort Mojave Tribe, 11 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 6001, 6002 (Ft. Mojave Tribal Ct. 1983). Plaintiff sued the tribe and tribal
chairperson for back pay allegedly due him because of wrongful discharge from tribal
employment. The defendants' motions to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity were
denied. After reviewing the early English and American history of the sovereign immunity
doctrine, the court concluded that the doctrine was not appropriate for the Fort Mojave
Tribe, saying "the court rejects the adoption of sovereign immunity as an affirmative
defense and holds that the full range of court authority be available to afford relief
against tribal officials whose actions contravene the legal rights of plaintiff." Id.
76. See generally Gonzales v. Allen, 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 6048, 6049 (Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Ct. 1989) (tribal immunity is not a bar
to equitable relief against the tribal government, although it is a bar to money damages
in ICRA actions); Butier v. Siletz Tribal Council, 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law.
Training Program) 6044, 6045 (Siletz Tribal Ct. 1989) (there is no tribal immunity for
ICRA actions filed against the tribe in tribal court as a matter of traditional law embodied
in the tribal constitution); Dupree v. Cheyenne River Hous. Auth., 16 Indian L. Rep.
(Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6106, 6108 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1988)
(finding language in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), that "[t]ribal
forums are available to vindicate rights created by the ICRA" requires tribal courts to
entertain causes of action based upon the ICRA); Oglala Sioux Tribal Personnel Bd. v.
Red Shirt, 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6052, 6052-53 (Oglala
Sioux Tribal Ct. App. 1983) (the ICRA is an implied waiver of sovereign immunity).
But see TBI Contractors, Inc. v. Navajo Tribe, 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law.
Training Program) 6017, 6018-19 (Navajo 1988) (the ICRA does not waive the tribe's
sovereign immunity).
77. See Moses v. Joseph, 2 Tribal Ct. Rep. A-51 (Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Ct. 1980);
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. Parisien, 1 Tribal Ct. Rep. A-95 (Turtle
Mountain Ct. App. 1979).
78. Mitchell v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes (Flathead Tribal Ct. 1982).
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follow the rule summarized by the United States Supreme Court
in Dugan v. Rank.79 In Dugan the Court permitted suits against
government officials and, "even though within the scope of their
authority, the powers themselves or the manner in which they
are exercised are constitutionally void." 80 Thus, where the tribal
court finds that tribal officials have acted within the scope of
their constitutional and statutory authority when performing the
acts in question, sovereign immunity will bar the suit.8 However,
where injunctive relief is sought and the plaintiff can show, at
least for the purpose of surviving a motion to dismiss, that the
defendant has acted unconstitutionally, or in violation of the
tribal code or the ICRA, tribal courts generally will not bar the
suit. ' 2 At least one tribal court has held that officials who act
in disregard of clear law are accorded no immunity and are
subject to monetary damages.83
C. Immunity of Tribal Entities
Tribal immunity cases often center on the provisions of the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA). 4 In passing the IRA,
Congress intended to allow the tribes a certain amount of free-
dom to enter and compete in the private business world.85 To
resolve the problem that immunity would pose to tribes in ob-
taining credit, Congress authorized the tribes to organize two
separate entities: a political governing body to exercise preexisting
powers of self-government pursuant to section 16 of the Act86
79. 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
80. Id. at 621-22.
81. See Garman v. Fort Belknap Community Council, 11 Indian L. Rep. (Am.
Indian Law. Training Program) 6017 (Ft. Belknap Tribal Ct. 1984); Stone v. Somday,
10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6039 (Colville Tribal Ct. 1983);
Satiacum v. Sterud, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6013
(Puyallup Tribal Ct. 1982).
82. See Gonzales v. Allen, 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
6048 (Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Ct. 1989); Miller v. Adams, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am.
Indian Law. Training Program) 6034 (Intertrib. App. Ct. 1982); Cudmore v. Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribal Council, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
6004 (Cheyenne River Sioux Trib. Ct. 1981); Moses v. Joseph, 2 Tribal Ct. Rep. A-51
(Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Ct. 1980); Kiowa Business Comm. v. Ware, 2 Tribal Ct. Rep. A-
45 (Kiowa Tribal Ct. of Indian Off. 1980); Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians
v. Pairsien, I Tribal Ct. Rep. A-95 (Turtle Mountain Ct. App. 1979); Halona v.
MacDonald, 1 Tribal Ct. Rep. A-70 (Navajo Ct. App. 1978); Burnette v. Rosebud Sioux
Tribe, 1 Tribal Ct. Rep. A-51 (Rosebud Sioux Tribal Ct. 1978).
83. Gonzales v. Allen, 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6048
(Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Ct. 1989).
84. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988).
85. 65 Interior Dec. 483 (1958); see also 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1988); 61 Interior Dec. 8
(1952).
86. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988).
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and a new tribal corporation to engage in business transactioi,.
pursuant to section 17.87
Those tribes electing to form section 17 business corporation..
received charters drafted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs {biA;
These charters often contain a clause authorizing the corporation
to sue and be sued.8" Some courts have held this languagc to be
a waiver of the immunity of the tribal corporation.89 However
the waiver is limited to actions involving the business activit;es
of the section 17 corporation.9 Complications in determinirg
whether the waiver applies can arise from the fact that ni.:'
tribes have not clearly separated the activities of their section 16
tribal governments from the section 17 business corpofations. "
Any action against the tribe acting in a governmental capacio
is beyond the scope of the section 17 corporation's waiver and
should be barred.92
Another issue regarding tribal immunity concerns which entiics
of the tribe may claim immunity. Corporations created pursuant
to section 17 of the IRA are tribal in character - they must oL
wholly owned by the tribe and are essentially alter egos of the
tribal government. However, the immunity of other tribal cx-
porations or authorities is less clear. Like other goverrnmiienlts
tribes may also charter corporations not owned or only partially
owned by them.93 If the corporation is an arm of tht tribal
government or a wholly owned corporation chartered by the
tribe, the tribe should be able to confer its immunity on the
corporation. 4 When private ownership enters the pictur(, khe
87. Id. § 477.
88. But see Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe, 103 Ariz. 425, 443 1P 2d 42 J
424 (1968).
89. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 517 0h
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 918 (1966); Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Gvoliolm.,
451 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Alaska 1978); Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 150 o'kk,
374 P.2d 691 (1962).
90. See Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Community, 455 F. Supp. 462 (D. \luw i".,!
Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. 1127 (1) V,14 t
1978); Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977). In Brunette v. L, -
Supp. 1382 (D. Idaho 1976), an action against a tribal court judge, the cout i .
without analysis, to dismiss relying on a section 17 "sue and be sued" clai . ,i x
1385. The court did not consider the matters discussed here, and the refusal w t,.,
was clearly erroneous.
91. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 157 n.13 (1973)
92. F. CoHEN, supra note 1, at 326.
93. See Namekagon Dev. Co. v. Bois Forte Reservation Hous. Auth., 51 -' 
(8th Cir. 1975); Hickey v. Crow Creek Hous. Auth., 379 F. Supp. 1002 (D. 0 I
94. See Namekagon Dev. Co. v. Bois Forte Reservation Hous. Auth., 3- "
23 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1975).
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issue is less certain. Immunity may be relevant whether or not
the tribe has a majority ownership in the entity or if it serves a
partfcular tribal governmental purpose. 95
IV. Preemption of State Laws in Indian Country
A. Supremacy Clause Analysis in General
The supremacy clause of the Constitution declares treaties and
federal statutes to be "the supreme law of the Land ... any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
Notwithstanding."' 9 Preemption problems arise under the su-
premacy clause whenever a state law is asserted to be unenforce-
able because it is contrary to a federal law. This problem occurs
when the state commands conduct which federal law forbids, or
when the federal government forbids state regulation of a field
of activity subject to federal supervision. The Supreme Court
has heard a number of cases in diverse fields97 wherein a state
law has been challenged as being in conflict with federal law
and, therefore, invalid under the supremacy clause.
The Supreme Court's approach to supremacy clause problems
differs by subject matter. Nevertheless, in all areas, the Court
pays particular respect to the judicial and legislative traditions
and precedents of the field under review. 98
B. Supremacy Clause Analysis in Indian Law Cases
Early in our nation's history, the effect of state laws in Indian
Country was addressed by the Supreme Court in Worcester v.
Georgia.99 Under Georgia law any non-Indian who wished to
reside in the Cherokee territory was required to obtain a license
from the governor of Georgia. Non-Indian missionaries were
convicted by Georgia courts for failure to obtain a state license.
95. Cf. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355 (1966) (holding
the Red Cross to be a federal instrumentality not subject to state unemployment taxation).
96. U.S. CONSr. art. VI, cl. 2.
97. See Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lock-
ridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971) (labor law); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U.S. 440 (1960) (maritime law); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132 (1963) (agricultural marketing); United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 371 U.S. 285 (1963) (government procurement); United States v. Boyd, 378
U.S. 39 (1964) (state taxation of federal contractors).
98. See Hirsch, Toward a View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515. See
also F. CoHEN, supra note 1, at 271-72 (and sources cited therein).
99. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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The Supreme Court reversed the missionaries' convictions under
state law.10 In an opinion written by Chief Justice John Marshall,
the Court held that Indian reservations were "distinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their
authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within
those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaran-
tied [sic] by the United States." 10' It follows from this concept
of Indian tribes as separate, although dependent, nations that
"the laws of [a state] can have no force" within reservation
boundaries.' 02
For more than a century the Court relied upon tribes' sover-
eignty to invalidate attempts by the states to encroach upon tribal
prerogatives. 0 3 However, in the early 1970s, the Court departed
from the conceptual clarity of the Worcester decision and began
to acknowledge certain limitations on tribal jurisdiction, even
within Indian Country. In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Commission,'04 an enrolled member and domicilary of the Navajo
Nation sued for a refund of state income taxes withheld on
income she earned on the reservation. The Court did not solely
rely on the Indian sovereignty doctrine to resolve the case.
Rather, the Court found the tribal sovereignty doctrine relevant
not because it provides a definitive resolution of the
issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop
against which the applicable treaties and federal sta-
tutes must be read. It must always be remembered that
the various Indian tribes were once independent and
sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty
long predates that of our own Government. Indians
today are American citizens. They have the right to
vote, to use state courts, and they receive some state
services. But it is nonetheless still true, as it was in the
last century, that "[tihe relation of the Indian tribes
100. Id. at 562-63.
101. Id. at 557.
102. Id. at 561, quoted in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,
168 (1973).
103. See The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866) (rejecting state efforts to
impose a land tax on reservation Indians on the ground that Tribes are a 'people
distinct from others' ... separated from the jurisdiction of Kansas"). The Court relied
upon the non-repudiated "federal instrumentality" doctrine to invalidate the application
of some state taxes to Indians at the turn of the century. Id. at 755. See also Leahy v.
State Treasurer of Okla., 297 U.S. 420 (1936); United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432
(1903). Cf. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943) (limiting the
doctrine sharply with respect to Indians).
104. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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living within the borders of the United States ... [is]
an anomalous one and of a complex character ....
They were, and always have been, regarded as having
a semi-independent position when they preserved their
tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as
a separate people, with the power of regulating their
internal and social relations, and thus far not brought
under the laws of the Union or of the State within
whose limits they resided."'' 5
With those principles to guide it, the Court concluded that the
treaty provision setting certain lands apart for the exclusive use
and occupancy of Navajos, together with the Tribe's right to
exclude non-Indians from the reservation, as well as provisions
of the Arizona Enabling Act disclaiming jurisdiction, precluded
the extension of state law, including state tax law, to reservation
Indians. 106
The most significant factor setting federal Indian law apart
from supremacy clause law in other fields is the role of tribes
as distinct political sovereigns in our federal system. 1' 7 Treaties
and executive orders establishing reservations and federal statutes
affecting tribes have been construed consistently as reserving the
right of self-government to the tribes."' 3 The Supreme Court has
held that this "tradition of sovereignty" is the "backdrop"
against which state incursions into Indian Country must be
judged.' 9 As a result, the standards of preemption"0 applied in
other areas are not applicable to federal laws affecting tribes or
reservations."'
10:5. Id. at 172-73 (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 174-75.
107. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
108. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206-07 (1978); Cherokee
Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17-18.
109. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1973). See
also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
110. In Worcester, the Court held that Georgia's laws were "repugnant" to the
Cherokee treaties and federal Indian statutes then in force. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
at 561. Modem supremacy clause terminology describes state laws as "preempted" by
federal laws or treaties, and the Court now uses this term in Indian cases. See Mc-
Clanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 (the first opinion in which the term "preemption" was used
concerning Indians, although the Court did so in describing several prior decisions).
111. See Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 838 (1982);
Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143. For a discussion of the development of the preemption doctrine
in the field of Indian law, see C. WMYcNsoN, AimmcAN IaNiAs, Tam AND THE LAW
87-119 (1987).
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Federal preemption of state laws affecting Indian Country is
not limited to those situations where Congress has expressly
announced an intention to preempt state activity.112 Instead, there
are "two independent, but related barriers" to state jurisdiction
in Indian Country.113 First, federal law may preempt state juris-
diction if the state's law interferes or is incompatible with federal
and tribal interests as reflected in federal law. The state's interest
must be sufficient enough to justify assertion of its authority. 1 4
Second, the exercise of state authority may also be barred by
inherent tribal sovereignty; that is, if the state law "unlawfully
infringe[s] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them."115
V. Public Law 280
A. Introduction
Since it is the supremacy clause which defeats the application
of state laws to matters to Indian Country," 6 Congress can
authorize state jurisdiction by superseding, repealing, or amend-
ing a preemptive treaty or statute. On occasion, treaties or
statutes have terminated federal protection over a tribe and its
territory.117 Many treaties and laws have also provided for cession
of tribal lands, which may then cease to be Indian Country."'
Congress has also passed a number of specific statutes in partic-
ular circumstances. Some statutes apply state legislative standards
only, such as the provision that incorporates the applicable state
112. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983); Ramah, 458
U.S. at 838; Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144.
113. Ramah, 458 U.S. at 837; Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143. A thoughtful analysis of
the two barriers, described as subject matter and geographical preemption, is found at
C. WILKiNSON, supra note 111, at 93-119.
114. Mescalero Apache, 462 U.S. at 334; Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145.
115. The Court has frequently mentioned this "second barrier" to state jurisdiction
in Indian Country. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959); see also Mescalero
Apache, 462 U.S. at 332; Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142; Washington v. Yakima Indian
Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 502 (1979); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976) (per
curiam); Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 426-27 (1971). However, tribal
sovereignty has never been used as the basis for invalidating the application of state law
in Indian Country. Instead, the Court has used the "first barrier" to strike down state
law on the ground that it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests.
See Mescalero Apache, 462 U.S. at 334; Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 96-115.
117. E.g., Klamath Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-564x (1988), construed in
Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974).
118. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430
U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
336 AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 16
law to determine heirship, descent, and partition of allotted
lands. 119 Other federal laws delegate to certain states law enforce-
ment jurisdiction over Indian Country within the state. The most
important of these is Public Law 83-280,' ° enacted in 1953.
Public Law 280 provided for the mandatory transfer to five,'
and later six,'2 states of jurisdiction over most criminal and
many civil matters arising in Indian Country within the states'
borders. The Act also extended to all other states the option of
accepting the same jurisdiction.2' Ten of the optional states
accepted some degree of jurisdiction over Indian Country. 24 In
119. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1988).
120. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (1988), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)). For a detailed
analysis of the statute, see Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction
Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. Rnv. 535 (1975).
121. California, Minnesota (except for the Red Lake Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon
(except for the Warm Springs Reservation), and Wisconsin (except for the Menominee
Reservation).
122. Alaska Territory was added by Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, § 1,
72 Slat. 545 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988)). The Act was
subsequently amended to authorize concurrent criminal jurisdiction over the Annette
Islands Reservation by the Metlakatla Indian Community. Act of Nov. 25, 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-523, §§ 1, 2, 84 Stat. 1358 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1988)).
123. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 7, 67 Stat. 588, 590 (repealed and reenacted
1968) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322 (1988)). States that disclaimed
jurisdiction over Indian lands in their constitutions as a condition of their admission to
statehood were authorized to amend the constitutions or statutes to remove any legal
impediments to the assumption of jurisdiction over Indian Country. See 25 U.S.C. §
1324 (1988).
124. Arizona accepted jurisdiction over air and water pollution only. ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 36-1865 (1986). Florida assumed full Public Law 280 jurisdiction. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 285.16 (West 1975). Idaho accepted jurisdiction over seven subject areas
and full Public Law 280 jurisdiction over tribal consent. IDAHO CODE §§ 67-5101 to -
5103 (1989). Iowa assumed civil jurisdiction over the Sac and Fox Reservation. IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 1.12-1.14 (West 1989). Iowa had earlier been delegated criminal jurisdiction
over 'the Reservation. See Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161. Montana assumed
criminal jurisdiction over the Flathead Reservation. In addition, the governor was em-
powered to proclaim state criminal or civil jurisdiction at the request of any tribe and
with the consent of affected counties. Tribal consent was made revocable within two
years of the governor's proclamation. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 83-801 to -806 (1966).
Nevada originally accepted full Public Law 280 jurisdiction, but permitted individual
counties to exclude themselves from acceptance of jurisdiction. This was amended in
1971 to require tribal consent. A 1975 amendment provided for retrocession except for
those tribes already subject to the Act who consented to continue. NEV. REv. STAT. §
41.430 (1989). Jurisdiction now has been retroceded for most reservations. North Dakota
accepted civil jurisdiction only, subject to tribal or individual consent. N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 27-19-01 to -13 (1974 & Supp. 1989). No tribe has consented and individual acceptance
has been held invalid under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. See
Nelson v. DuBois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1975). South Dakota assumed jurisdiction only
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1968 Public Law 280 was amended to require a majority of a
tribe's enrolled members to consent in a special election to a
state's assumption of jurisdiction over Indian Country.' 25
B. Scope of State Civil Jurisdiction
Delegated Under Public Law 280
Public Law 280 grants states "jurisdiction.. . over civil causes
of action" and provides that the "civil laws of [the] State that
are of general application" shall have the same force and effect
in Indian Country as they have elsewhere in the state. 26 The Act
precludes any state from alienating, encumbering, or taxing trust
and restricted Indian property. The act also prohibits the states
from applying their regulatory laws "in a manner inconsistent
with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any reg-
ulation made pursuant thereto."' 127
over criminal offenses and civil causes of action arising on highways, and conditioned
acceptance of full Public Law 280 jurisdiction on federal government reimbursement to
the state for the cost of the additional jurisdiction assumed. S.D. CODIUID LAws ANN.
§§ 1-1-12 to -21 (1985). The state supreme court later held this assumption of jurisdiction
invalid. See In re Hankin's Petition, 80 S.D. 435, 125 N.W.2d 839, 841-42 (1964). Utah
has a post-1968 statute accepting jurisdiction when tribes consent. UTAH CODE ANN. §§
63-36-9 to 63-36-21 (1989). No tribe has consented. Washington assumed full Public Law
280 jurisdiction over non-Indians and over Indians on nontrust land. Jurisdiction over
Indians on trust land is limited to eight subject areas unless a tribe consents to full Public
Law 280 jurisdiction. WAsH. Rv. CODE ANN. §§ 37.12.010 to .070 (1964).
125. 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988).
126. Id. §§ 1321(a), 1322(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988). A discussion of the Act's
grant of criminal jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this paper and, therefore, is not
included.
127. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b), 1322(b) (1988); 28 U.S.C. 1360(b) (1988). Public Law 280
also prohibits states from exercising jurisdiction that would "deprive any Indian or any
Indian tribe, band or community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under
Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the
control, licensing, or regulation thereof." 25 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1988). The exception has
been held to apply to reservations set aside by executive order. See Quechan Tribe v.
Rowe, 350 F. Supp. 106, 110-11 (S.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd in part and remanded, 531 F.2d
408 (9th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court has declined an opportunity to provide a
definitive identification of the rights protected by "treaty, agreement, or statute." See
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 485 (1973). However, the Ninth Circuit has held that a
tribe's exercise of powers under the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988),
is within the exception to Public Law 280. State regulation or control of Indian hunting
or fishing would also be contrary to the purpose and language of Public Law 280's
exceptions, which were designed to preserve the jurisdictional status quo with regard to
those matters. Rowe, 531 F.2d at 410-11. But see Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of
Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (suggesting that in some circumstances states can regulate
reservation fishing if necessary for conservation of a species).
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Two major areas of controversy have arisen from the language
that grants civil jurisdiction in Public Law 280. The first area
concerns whether a county or city ordinance qualifies as one of
the "civil laws of [the] State that are of general application"
and that are to have the same force and effect in Indian Country
as they have elsewhere in the state. In Santa Rosa Band v. Kings
County,28 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Act
applied only the civil laws of the state itself and did not subject
Indian Country to local regulation by a subdivision of the state. 
29
According to the court:
Congress had in mind a distribution of jurisdiction
which would make the tribal government over the
reservation more or less the equivalent of a county or
local government in other areas within the state, em-
powered, subject to the paramount provisions of state
law, to regulate matters of local concern within the
area of its jurisdiction. 30
The Ninth Circuit's decision enables tribal governments in Public
Law 280 states to maintain a significant role in matters of local
concern.131
The second area of controversy arising from the grant of civil
jurisdiction concerns whether Public Law 280 delegated to the
states all civil jurisdiction over "civil causes of action." This
language implies that the state acquired only adjudicatory juris-
diction and not the broader power to legislate and regulate in
Indian Country. However, the statutory grant also provides that
the "civil laws of [the] State ... shall have the same force and
effect within such Indian country ... as they have elsewhere
within that State."'3 2 This language suggests that Congress con-
ferred full legislative jurisdiction on Public Law 280 states. The
meaning of the statute was hotly contested until the Supreme
Court resolved the matter adversely to the states in Bryan v.
Itasca County.'33
Bryan involved an attempt by a Minnesota county to assess a
state property tax on an Indian's unrestricted property located
on trust land, within an Indian reservation over which the state
128. 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
129. Id. at 659-64.
130. Id. at 663.
131. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 366.
132. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1988).
133. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
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had been granted jurisdiction by Public Law 280. The personal
property involved was not trust property, and the state argued
that it therefore became subject to the general "civil laws'! of
the state, including its tax laws. Relying upon the Act's legislative
history and the canon of construction requiring ambiguities in
federal laws to be construed in favor of the Indians,1 14 the Court
held that Public Law 280 only authorizes state courts to apply
"their rules of decision to decide disputes between Indians and
between Indians and other citizens. ' 135
The effect of the Court's decision is to confine the civil grant
of Public Law 280 to adjudicatory jurisdiction only. The rea-
soning behind the Court's decision also precludes states from
applying their regulatory laws to trust or restricted property in
Indian Country-a matter that was presented to the Supreme
Court eleven years after Bryan was decided.
In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians1 6 two
tribes were operating high-stakes bingo and poker games on their
reservations under the authority of tribal ordinances. California,
a mandatory Public Law 280 state, attempted to enforce its penal
laws prohibiting bingo games unless they were conducted by
charitable organizations and offered prizes not exceeding $250
per game. Violations of the state law were punishable as a
misdemeanor. Riverside County sought to apply its ordinance
forbidding gambling on card games, with exceptions if munici-
palities licensed the card games. A major issue was whether state
and county laws were "criminal laws" applicable to Indian
Country under Public Law 280, or were "regulations" excepted
from Public Law 280 by the Bryan rule. 13
In ruling for the tribes, the Court adopted the Fifth Circuit's
analysis,138 distinguishing between criminal/prohibitory and civil/
regulatory laws. The Court reasoned:
[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit
conduct, it falls within Pub. L. 280's grant of criminal
jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits the
conduct at issue, subject to regulation, it must be
classified as civil/regulatory and Pub. L. 280 does not
authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation.13
134. Id. at 379.
135. Id. at 381.
136. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
137. Id. at 208-10.
138. See Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
139. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209.
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Applying this analysis, the Court found that since California
permitted charitable bingo, its gaming law was regulatory and
could not be enforced on the reservations. 140 The Court also
concluded that a regulatory law could not be converted into a
criminal law subject to application in Indian Country, merely
because a violation of the law is made a misdemeanor.14'
C. Assumption of Public Law 280 Jurisdiction
The unilateral action of a tribal government to confer state
jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising on the reservation
and. involving an Indian defendant is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the state.142 Before the 1967 amendment to the
Act, a state must have taken some affirmative legislative act in
order to assume jurisdiction over Indian Country.43 After 1968
a state must obtain the consent, in a special election, of the
Indians over whose reservation(s) the state intends to assume
jurisdiction. 44
Additionally, eleven states 4- that were required to disclaim
jurisdiction over Indian lands as a condition to their admission
to the Union must amend "where necessary" their state consti-
tutions or statutes to remove "any legal impediment" to the
assumption of jurisdiction under Public Law 280.146 Seven "dis-
claimer" states have enacted laws accepting jurisdiction under
Public Law 280 without an amendment to the states' constitu-
140. Id. at 210-12.
141. Id. at 209.
142. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 427 (1971).
143. Id. In Kennerly, the Blackfeet Tribal Council enacted a law in 1967 providing
that the tribal court and state court would have concurrent jurisdiction over all actions
in which the defendant was a tribal member. However, the state took no affirmative
legislative action to assume such jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the state court accepted
jurisdiction over an action on a debt arising from the Indian defendants' purchase of
food on credit from a grocery store located on the reservation. The Supreme Court held
that the unilateral action of the tribal council in enacting the tribal law conferring
concurrent jurisdiction on the state was insufficient to vest the state with civil jurisdiction.
Id. at 429-30.
The 1968 amendment to the Act deleted section 7, which required "affirmative legis-
lative action" by states assuming jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988). Under the
present Act, the only federal procedural requirement appears to be for tribal consent by
referendum. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322, 1326 (1988).
144. Kennerly, 400 U.S. at 429.
145. Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See F. CottN, supra note 1, at 368
n.175.
146. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 6, 67 Stat. 590 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 1324 (1988)).
340,
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss2/3
SURVEY OF CIVIL JURISDICTION
tions.' 47 In Washington v. Confederated Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation,'4 the Supreme Court concluded that federal law
does not require amendment of a "disclaimer" state's constitu-
tion as a condition to a state's assumption of jurisdiction under
Public Law 280. Rather, removal of any state's constitutional
"impediment" to assumption of Public Law 280 jurisdiction is
solely a question of state law.149
VI. Tribal Governments in the Modern Era
A. Introduction
Most traditional tribal governing systems were altered as a
result of contacts with the European settlers. Disruption of tribal
economies, technology introduced by the settlers, and the influ-
ences of missionaries and trade contributed to the disappearance
or alteration of tribal institutions.
Perhaps the most significant reason for the disruption of
traditional tribal systems was that before European contact most
tribes lacked centralized authority. Rather, many tribes consisted
of small, largely independent bands or villages which united only
for a specific purpose, such as war. After contact many tribes
united permanently to confront the Europeans.150 Others were
"united" by federal government policy for convenience in treaty
making and land cessions, 151 and leaders were designated to
represent tribes in negotiations. The later policy of leasing tribal
land for the exploitation of timber and minerals necessitated a
tribal authority to legitimize the leases.' 52
. 147. These states are Arizona, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah,
and Washington. See F. Coami, supra note 1, at 368 n.177. In response to the North
Dakota Supreme Court's decision in State v. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1955),
holding that an amendment was necessary, North Dakota amended its constitution. Act
approved June 24, 1958, ch. 430, 1959 N.D. Laws 843-44.
148. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
149. Id. at 478-93.
150. For example, the Cherokees formed a central government patterned after Anglo-
American institutions. See R. STmicKA.iN, Fu AND TH Spnrs 62-65 (1975).
151. A prominent example of this policy is the treaties made with the small tribes of
the Puget Sound area, where legal designations remain unresolved to this day. See United
States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 354-82 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
152. For example, the Navajo Tribal Council was established by the federal govern-
ment in 1923 after the discovery of oil within the Navajo Reservation. See D. PARMM,
THE NAvAjos AND TE NEw DFAL 14-17 (1976). The Navajo Nation had previously been
composed of many autonomous groups united only for war and in making treaties with
the United States. Even the BIA previously had administered Navajo lands as several
separate reservations. Id. at 6-12.
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B. Origins of Modern Tribal Courts
In most cases the decline and suppression of traditional insti-
tutions left a vacuum in tribal governing authority. In 1882 the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) initiated the practice of estab-
lishing Courts of Indian Offenses on Indian reservations to
provide law and order and to undermine the authority of the
traditional chiefs. 153 Because the BIA appointed and paid the
judges and police, it exercised significant influence over the
system.'"
The Courts of Indian Offenses functioned mostly as instru-
ments of Bureau control until the reforms instituted by BIA
Cormissioner John Collier and the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934 (IRA).' 5 The IRA marked a major turning point in
fede;ral Indian policy. It discontinued allotment of tribal lands
and encouraged tribes to become self-governing. Largely as a
result of the policies encouraged by the IRA, most tribes have
now developed their own tribal courts and codes.
Tribes have inherent authority to establish their own dispute
resolution systems, including the establishment of courts.' The
constitutions of tribes organized under the IRA specifically pro-
vide authority for tribes to enact ordinances and to establish
courts. 57 Most tribes have established their own codes and courts
153. W. HAoAN, INDuAN PoLIcE AND JuDas 104-25 (1966); F. PRUCHiA, AMERICAN
INDLAN Poucy IN CRisIS 209-11 (1976). In 1900, two-thirds of the reservations had Courts
of Indian Offenses. W. HA AN, supra, at 109; F. PRucHA, supra, at 210. By 1928, the
number of such courts had dwindled to 30, serving less than half the reservations. See
INsTflnn FOR GOV'T RESEARCH, TBE PROBLEM OF INDAN ADMINISmATION 769 (1928).
By 1989, there were only 17 Courts of Indian Offenses. 25 C.F.R. § 11.1 (1989).
154. W. HAoAN, supra note 153, at 101-02, 154-57, 179.
155. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988). The IRA encourages tribes to form representative
forms of government by authorizing tribal members to adopt a constitution. Id. § 476.
The IFLA requires a referendum to accept its provisions, id. § 478, to organize under a
constitution, id. § 476, and to establish a corporate charter, id. § 477. The constitutions
and charters that actually were issued uniformly provide for an elected tribal council. F.
Co EN, supra note 1, at 332 n.7. In 1935, Commissioner Collier published a revised
Code of Indian Tribal Offenses for the Courts of Indian Offenses. See 3 Fed. Reg. 952-
59 (1938). With minor amendments, the revised code remains in force today. See 25
C.F.R. § 11 (1988).
156. The Five Civilized Tribes (Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole
Nations) established effective courts and codes during the nineteenth century. See R.
STcimND, Fam AND TnE Spmrrs 53-72 (1975); M. Yotmo, REDSKINs, RUM.ESHIRTS &
RErNECKs ch. 1 (1961). More recently, non-IRA tribes have established sophisticated
tribal courts as a matter of inherent tribal sovereignty. E.g., NAvAJo TRm. CODE tit. 7,
§§ 101-853 (1977 & Supp. 1984-1985).
157. The Code of Tribal Offenses also expressly authorizes tribes to establish tribal
courts and codes to supplant the Bureau of Indian Affairs courts and code. See 25
C.F.R. § 11.1(e) (1988).
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either pursuant to their inherent authority or their constitutional
powers."5 8
Most tribes that have tribal courts have developed tribal codes.
These tribal codes cover basic civil and criminal matters; many
are much more extensive, covering such areas as land use regu-
lation, natural resource development and regulation, environ-
mental regulation, taxation, and other issues. Where a tribal code
does not address a particular issue, most tribal codes provide
that the tribal court shall apply tribal traditional, common law,
federal law, and then state law, in that order. 159
VII. Personal Jurisdiction
A. Tribal Courts and Courts of Indian Offenses
Many early tribal codes copied the civil jurisdiction provision
of the Courts of Indian Offenses,)6 which limited jurisdiction to
"suits wherein the defendant is a member of the tribe or tribes
within [the courts'] jurisdiction, and of all other suits between
members and nonmembers which are brought before the courts
by stipulation of both parties.' 61 On most reservations tribal
codes now contain long-arm statutes. 62 In the few instances
where a court operates under the jurisdictional limitation of the
Courts of Indian Offenses, the only forum for most civil actions
arising in Indian Country filed by Indians against non-Indians
is state court. 63
State courts do not have jurisdiction over a civil action arising
in Indian Country filed by a non-Indian against an Indian,
because the state court's assumption of jurisdiction would inter-
fere "with the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them."' The Supreme Court has held that
158. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 n.7 (1978); NATIONAL
AMmucAN INDIAN COURT JUDGEs AWs'N, INDIAN CouRTs AND THE FUTURE 42 (D. Getches
ed. 1978). By 1989, there were approximately 120 tribal courts and only 17 Courts of
Indian Offenses. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.1 (1988).
159. E.g., LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE BIAc EET TRIEE OF THE BLACKFEET INDIAN
RESERVATION, MONTANA ch. 2, § 2.
160. E.g., LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE THREE AFFIIATED TRIBES OF THE FORT
BERTHOLD INDIAN RESERVATION (restricting jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants to
those cases in which the non-Indian consents to tribal court jurisdiction).
161. 25 C.F.R. § 11.22 (1988).
162. See infra text accompanying notes 166-69.
163. Federal courts would provide an alternate forum to state courts in those cases
where the parties were citizens of different states and the $50,000 jurisdictional amount
was satisfied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
164. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
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a state court may hear a civil action arising in Indian Country
when the action is filed by an Indian against a non-Indian, at
least when the tribal court does not have jurisdiction over the
action.165
B. Tribal Long Arm Statutes
Most tribes have departed from the jurisdictional model of the
Code of Tribal Offenses and have adopted jurisdictional provi-
sicns similar to those of state "long-arm" statutes. These long-
ann provisions authorize tribal courts to assert' personal juris-
diction over:
1. any person residing, located or present within the
reservation;
2. any person who transacts, conducts, or performs
any business or activity within the reservation,
either in person or by an agent or representative;
3. any person who owns, uses or possesses any prop-
erty within the reservation; and
4. any person who commits a tortious act or engages
in tortious conduct within the reservation. 66
Where tribal court has been empowered to assert jurisdiction
over civil actions arising in Indian Country and involving an
Indian defendant, a state court's assumption of jurisdiction over
such an action is barred as an infringement upon tribal self-
government. 67
There is no federal law which expressly limits the personal
jurisdiction of tribal courts in civil actions. However, tribal long-
arm statutes are subject to the same "minimum contacts"
lirnitationses as state long-arm statutes. Any other limitation on
the personal jurisdiction of a tribal court is prescribed by tribal
law.169
165. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation v. Wold Eng'g,
467 U.S. 138 (1984). The Court reasoned that the state court's assumption of jurisdiction
in a situation where the tribal code prohibited the tribal court from exercising jurisdiction
over a non-consenting, non-Indian defendant would not undermine tribal self-government,
and was not preempted by incompatible federal law. Id. at 147-51.
166. LAw AND ORDER CODE OF Ta SHosHozN AND ARAPAHO TRIaEs OF Tm WiND
RvER INDIAN REsERVATiON, Wyohamo tit. I, § 1-2-3; LAW AND OaER CODE FOR Tm
UTE INDIAN TRiEE OF THE UtNTAH AND O'EAY RESERvATON, UTAH ch. 2, § 1-2-3.
167. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). See infra text accompanying notes 173-
76.
168. See World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 160-65.
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VIII. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A. General Civil Litigation
As with the case of personal jurisdiction, there are no federal
limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of tribal courts. Rather,
the only limits on a tribal court's subject matter jurisdiction
would be prescribed by a tribal code. Most tribal codes are
expansive in their grant of subject matter jurisdiction to tribal
courts. For example, many tribal codes vest the tribal court with
"jurisdiction over all civil causes of action arising on the reser-
vation. 1 70 Other codes are slightly more restrictive, conferring
upon the tribal court jurisdiction to hear all civil causes of action
except one which
does not involve either the Tribe, its officers, agents,
employees, property or enterprises, or a member of the
Tribe, or a member of a federally recognized tribe, if
some other forum exists for the handling of the matter
and if the matter is not one in which the rights of the
Tribe or its members may be directly or indirectly
affected.1 71
Even the Courts of Indian Offenses are empowered to hear "all
suits wherein the defendant is a member of the tribe or tribes
within [the court's] jurisdiction, ana of all other suits between
members and nonmembers which are brought before the courts
by stipulation of both parties."17 2
Where a state has not assumed civil jurisdiction pursuant to
Public Law 280, state court jurisdiction over civil actions arising
in Indian Country is severely limited. In the landmark case of
Williams v. Lee, 73 the Supreme Court held that state courts have
no jurisdiction over a breach of contract action filed by a non-
Indian against an Indian when the claim arises in Indian Country.
The Court found that an assertion of jurisdiction under those
circumstances would "infringe on the right of reservation Indians
to make their own laws and be governed by them."' 174 A state
court would have jurisdiction only "where essential tribal rela-
170. E.g., LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE SHosHOON AND ARAPAHO TRIBEs OF THE
WIND RwER INDIAN REsERVATION, WYOMING tit. I, § 1-2-5.
171. E.g., LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE UTE INDANr TRIBE OF THE UINTAH AND
OuRAY RESERVATION, UTAH ch. 2, § 1-2-5.
172. 25 C.F.R. § 11.22 (1988).
173. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
174. Id. at 220.
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tions were not involved and where the rights of Indians would
not be jeopardized."' 175
Since the rule of Williams divests state courts of subject matter
jurisdiction over claims arising in Indian Country and filed by
a non-Indian against an Indian, it follows even more strongly
that state courts have no jurisdiction to hear claims arising in
Indian Country when both parties are Indians. 76 Moreover, since
Welliams deprives the state courts of subject matter jurisdiction,
the parties cannot confer jurisdiction by their consent.
'While Williams precludes state courts from hearing actions
filed by non-Indians against Indians on claims arising in Indian
Country, it does not prevent the state from accepting jurisdiction
over an action filed by an Indian against a non-Indian. Even if
the: claim arises in Indian Country - at least where the tribal
code deprives the tribal court of jurisdiction over the action -
the Indian may file in state court. In Three Affiliated Tribes of
the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation v. Wold Engineering,17 1
North Dakota attempted to deny jurisdiction over actions brought
by the tribes unless the tribes waived their sovereign immunity
and consented to state jurisdiction over all actions arising on the
reservation. The Supreme Court held that Public Law 280 pre-
cluded the state from denying jurisdiction in that manner. 7 1
Several state decisions have also guaranteed Indian plaintiffs
access to state courts by invoking the equal protection clause. 79
State courts have jurisdiction over suits by non-Indians against
non-Indians, even when the claim arises in Indian Country, but
only if Indian interests are not affected. 80 State courts also have
jurisdiction over suits against Indian defendants that arise outside
of Indian Country, such as when an Indian leaves the reservation
and enters a commercial transaction to be performed off-reser-
vation.'8 '
B. Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies
The recent Supreme Court cases may affect the power of state
courts to hear cases arising in Indian Country, even when they
175. Id. at 219-20. See also Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
176. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976).
177. 476 U.S. 877 (1986).
178. Id. at 884-87.
179. See Paiz v. Hughes, 76 N.M. 562, 417 P.2d 51 (1966); Bonnet v. Seekins, 126
Mont. 24, 243 P.2d 317 (1952).
180. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
181. E.g., Smith Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 149 Ariz. 524, 531,
720 P.2d 499, 506 (1986).
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have subject matter jurisdiction over such actions. In National
Farmers Union Inc. v. Crow Tribe,182 a tribal court had entered
a default judgment against a non-Indian defendant in a tort
action that arose in Indian Country.8 3 Instead of appearing
specially to challenge the tribal court's jurisdiction or filing a
motion to set aside the default judgment, the defendant's insurer
filed an action in federal court challenging the tribal court's
jurisdiction to enter an order against a non-Indian defendant.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that whether the tribal court
had jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant in an action arising
in Indian Country was justiciable under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
However, rather than resolving the jurisdictional dispute, the
Court ruled that a federal court should abstain from deciding
the issue until the tribal court determined its own jurisdiction in
the first instance. The Court made it clear that Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,'3 which held that tribes have no crim-
inal jurisdiction over non-Indians, did not control the question
of the tribes' civil jurisdiction.8 "
Similarly, in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 8 6 the
Court ruled that a federal court should stay its hand in a case
over which the court had diversity jurisdiction,'8 in order to
permit a tribal court to determine its own jurisdiction over
parallel tribal court proceedings against a non-Indian defendant.
Again, the Supreme Court did not actually decide whether the
tribal court had authority to hear a case against a non-Indian
defendant. However, the Court's language suggests that tribal
182. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
183. The tort occurred on state-owned property within the exterior boundaries of the
Crow Indian Reservation. Id. at 847.
184. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
185. Oliphant, 471 U.S. at 854.
186. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
187. For a number of years, it was assumed that federal courts' diversity jurisdiction
was more limited in Indian Country than elsewhere. The limitation was thought to arise
from the fact that a federal court in a diversity case sat as an alternative to the state
courts and applied state law. Therefore, it was believed that the federal court could not
entertain any case that the state court could not hear (such as a claim arising in Indian
Country and filed against an Indian defendant) even if diversity of citizenship existed
and the jurisdictional amount was satisfied. See, e.g., Hot Oil Serv. Co. v. Hall, 366
F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966); Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 986 (1966).
The rule was changed in Iowa Mutual. In that case, an insurance company sued in a
tribal court brought a diversity action in federal court seeking a determination that its
policy did not cover the disputed claim. The defendant in the federal action was an
Indian, and the Supreme Court assumed that the state courts would have no jurisdiction
over the case. Nevertheless, the Court held that the technical requirements of diversity
jurisdiction were present. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 13.
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courts do have jurisdiction over actions arising in Indian Country
and involving a non-Indian defendant: "Tribal authority over
the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important
part of tribal sovereignty.... Civil jurisdiction over such activ-
ities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively
limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute."' 88
These cases suggest that, in order to avoid undue interference
with tribal self-government, a state court would be precluded
from hearing a case over which it has concurrent jurisdiction if
parallel proceedings were pending in tribal court. 89
C. Domestic Relations
1. Divorce
.As Williams v. Lee'90 suggests, state courts lack jurisdiction to
grant a divorce when both parties are Indians domiciled in Indian
Country. 19' Rather, the tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction. 92
However, when both parties are domiciled outside Indian Coun-
try, the state court does have jurisdiction to grant a divorce. 93
Similarly, when both parties are non-Indians domiciled in Indian
Country, the state court has jurisdiction over the divorce action
on the ground that such jurisdiction does not infringe upon tribal
self-government.
"It is far from settled whether state or tribal courts have
jurisdiction over divorce actions between Indian and non-Indian
spouses domiciled in Indian Country. Williams and its progeny
suggest that a non-Indian spouse would have to file a petition
for divorce in tribal court, while an Indian spouse could file in
tribal or state court. However, states have traditionally based
divorce jurisdiction on the domicile and status of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's domicile and status remain important even in
states that have adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,
which permits jurisdiction to be based on the domicile of either
party. Accordingly, there is a tendency for state courts to accept
jurisdiction over a divorce action brought by a non-Indian against
188. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18 (citations omitted).
189. At least one federal court has applied this rule even where no tribal court action
was pending. See Wellman v. Chevron, Inc., 815 F,2d 577 (9th Cir. 1987).
190. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). See supra text accompanying notes 173-76.
291. See In re Marriage of Limpy, 195 Mont. 314, 636 P.2d 266, 269 (1981); Whyte
v. District Court, 140 Colo. 334, 346 P.2d 1012, 1015 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 829
(1960).
192. Id.
1.93. United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 999 (1975).
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an Indian domiciled in Indian Country. 194 However, accepting
jurisdiction in this situation clearly infringes on tribal self-gov-
ernment.
2. Adoption and Child Custody
In 1978, Congress became concerned that "an alarmingly high
percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal,
often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal
public and private agencies, and that an alarmingly high per-
centage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and
adoptive homes and institutions. " 19- To reverse "[tihe wholesale
separation of Indian children from their families,' ' 196 Congress
enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).19
The purposes of the Act are (1) to protect the best interests
of Indian children and (2) to promote the stability and security
of Indian tribes and families.193 To accomplish these goals, Con-
gress established minimum federal standards to govern the re-
moval of Indian children from their families and the placement
of Indian children in foster or adoptive homes or institutions.
The minimum federal standards established by the ICWA apply
to state court actions if the proceedings:
(1) involve (i) a foster care placement; (ii) termination
of parental rights; or (iii) pre-adoptive or adoptive
placement;19 and
194. W. CAamy, AiAmcA IN ,Nr LAW IN A NursnELa 154 (1988).
195. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADmiN. NEWS 7530, 7531 (reporting that,
according to a survey of five States conducted before the ICWA was enacted, Indian
children were at least 10 times more likely to be separated from their families as non-
Indian children. According to a 16-state survey, 85 percent of Indian children in foster
care were living in non-Indian homes and 90 percent of non-relative adoptions of Indian
children were made by non-Indians.).
196. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & Am.m. NEws 7530, 7531.
197. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988)).
198. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmiN. NEaWs 7530, 7530.
199. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988). Expressly excluded from the definition of "child
custody proceeding," to which the ICWA applies, are (1) placements based on acts of a
child that are essentially criminal in nature; and (2) custody awards in divorce proceedings.
Id.
The jurisdictional provisions of the ICWA apply whether the "child custody proceed-
ing" is voluntary or involuntary. See id. § 1913(a) (requiring a voluntary termination of
parental rights or consent to foster care placement to be "executed in writing and
recorded before a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction" (emphasis added)). See
also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 51 n.26 (1989)
(finding that a voluntary consent to adoption of reservation-domiciled children was
effective only if recorded before a tribal court judge).
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(2) concern an "Indian child," i.e., an unmarried
minor who is (i) a member of an Indian tribe or (ii)
the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe
where the child is also eligible for membership in the
tribe.2w
If the ICWA applies, the Act specifies under what circumstances
state courts have jurisdiction.20 1 Other provisions of the ICWA
set procedural and substantive safeguards for those child custody
proceedings that occur in state court. The procedural safeguards
include requirements concerning notice to the child's tribe and
appointment of counsel for the child's parents or Indian custo-
diaa;" parental and tribal rights of intervention2 3 and petition
for invalidation of illegal proceedings;0 4 procedures governing
voluntary consent to termination of parental rights; 205 and a full
faith and credit obligation in respect to tribal court decisions. 201
The substantive safeguards include the applicable standard of
proof 103 and the preferences which must be followed if the child
is placed in foster or adoptive care. 201
Generally, state courts have jurisdiction over civil actions in-
volving an Indian who is present outside of Indian Country.2°9
The general rule does not necessarily pertain, however, when the
civil action is a child custody proceeding210 involving an Indian
200. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1988).
201. Id. § 1911(a)-4b).
202. Id. § 1912(a)-(b).
203. Id. § 1911(c). An Indian child's parents, Indian custodian, see id. § 1903(6),
and tribe have a right to intervene at any point in state court proceedings for the foster
care placement of or termination of parental rights to an Indian child. Id. § 1911 (c).
204. Id. § 1914.
205. Id. § 1913.
206. Id. § 1911(d).
207. Id. § 1912(e)-(f). A parents' rights may be terminated only if the evidence,
supported by the testimony of qualified expert witnesses, establishes beyond a reasonable
doubt that continued custody by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child. Id. § 1912(0. An Indian child may not be placed in foster
care involuntarily unless there is clear and convincing evidence, supported by the testimony
of qualified expert witnesses, that continued custody by the parent is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child. Id. § 1912(e).
208. Id. § 1915.
209. See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973);
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968); Organized Village
of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1962); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 683
(1942).
210. See supra text accompanying note 199 for a definition of "child custody pro-
ceeding.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss2/3
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child.211 The Indian child's tribe21 has exclusive jurisdiction over
a child custody proceeding when the child is a ward of the tribal
court or "resides or is domiciled within the reservation. '213
Section 1911(a) does not apply "where such jurisdiction is oth-
erwise vested in the State by existing Federal law. '214
Although determining whether a tribe has exclusive jurisdiction
over a child custody proceeding depends upon the Indian child's
domicile, 25 the ICWA does not define "domicile." In a recent
decision the Supreme Court concluded that, notwithstanding the
statute's absence of a definition of domicile, "Congress intended
a uniform law of domicile for the ICWA. ''21 6 The Court further
found that, for ICWA purposes, an illegitimate child acquires
the domicile of his or her mother217 even though:
(a) the child had never resided on or physically been
present at the mother's domicile;218 and
211. See supra text accompanying note 200 for a definition of "Indian child.
212. The Indian child's tribe is defined as
the Indian tribe in which the Indian child is a member or eligible for
membership or, in the case of an Indian child who is a member of or
eligible for membership in more than one tribe, the Indian tribe with which
the Indian child has the more significant contacts.
25 U.S.C. § 1903(5) (1988).
213. Id. § 1911 (a). This provision, granting exclusive jurisdiction over the child custody
proceedings involving an Indian child domiciled on the reservation has a strong basis in
pre-ICWA case law. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387-89 (1976) (per
curiam) (tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceeding where all parties
are tribal members and reservation residents); Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston, 393
F. Supp. 719, 730-31 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction over
custody of Indian children found to be domiciled on reservation); Wakefield v. Little
Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228, 237-38 (1975) (same); In re Adoption of Buehi, 87
Wash. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334, 1341 (1976) (state court lacks jurisdiction over custody of
Indian children placed in off-reservation foster care by tribal court order).
214. This proviso refers to Public Law 280. See supra text accompanying notes 116-
49. The ICWA permits a tribe over whose reservation a state has assumed civil jurisdiction
to reassume jurisdiction over child custody proceedings upon petition to the Secretary of
the Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 1918 (1988).
215. See supra text accompanying note 213.
216. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 47 (1989). The
case concerned the illegitimate twins of enrolled members of the Mississippi Choctaw
Tribe. Both parents were domiciled on the Reservation. The parents had arranged for
the children to be born in a hospital 200 miles from the Reservation. Thirteen days after
the twins were born, the parents executed a voluntary consent to the children's adoption
before a state court judge. Five days later, a non-Indian couple petitioned the state court
to adopt the twins. Twelve days later, the state court entered a final decree of adoption.
Id. at 38.
217. Id. at 48-49.
218. Id. at 45-49.
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(b) the parents voluntarily consented to the child's
adoption; 2 9 and
(c) the child's parents went to great lengths to ensure
that the child was born away from the mother's
domicileYm
If a child is not domiciled or residing on the reservation at
the time proceedings are initiated, the Act creates concurrent
jurisdiction in the state and tribal court. 221 However, the ICWA
evidences a preference for tribal court jurisdiction by requiring
a state court to transfer proceedings for foster care placement
or termination of parental rights to tribal court upon the petition
of the child's parent(s) or tribe.m" If the state court receives a
petition to transfer a proceeding, it may refuse to transfer the
proceeding only if (i) the tribal court declines jurisdiction; (ii) a
parent objects to the transfer; or (iii) the state court finds "good
cause" not to transfer.n
3. Probate
State courts have no jurisdiction over the probate of Indian
trust property. Such jurisdiction is exclusively federal.22 Appli-
cation of Williams v. LeeY5 prevents the states from exercising
jurisdiction over the probate of non-trust movables of an Indian
who died domiciled in Indian Country. State courts do have
jurisdiction over the probate of any land located outside of
Indian Country and may exercise ancillary jurisdiction over mov-
219. The Court expressly found it "clear that a rule of domicile that would permit
individual Indian parents to defeat the ICWA's jurisdictional scheme is inconsistent with
what Congress intended." Id. at 50.
The Court also found that the parents' consent to termination of their parental rights,
recorded before a state court judge, was ineffective on the ground that such consent
must be recordedbefore a "judge of a court of competent jurisdiction." Id. at 51 n.26.
The Court held that, in the case of reservation-domiciled children, a consent to termination
of parental rights was effective only if it was recorded before a tribal court judge. Id.
at 51.
220. Id. at 39.
221. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988).
222. Id. § 1911(b). As to the preference for tribal court jurisdiction, see Holyfield,
490 U.S. at 36.
223. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988). When a state court retains jurisdiction over an
ICWA proceeding, it must place Indian children in foster or adoptive care according to
the preferences specified at id. § 1915. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 40 n.13.
224. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 371-380 (1988). Probate of Indian trust property is administered
by the Department of the Interior. Id. § 372.
225. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). See supra text accompanying notes 173-76.
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ables located outside of Indian Country which are part of the
estate of an Indian who died domiciled in Indian Country.226
State courts also have jurisdiction over the non-trust estates
of Indians who died domiciled outside Indian Country and over
the estates of non-Indians who died domiciled in Indian Country,
at least where the heirs are non-Indian. It is unsettled whether
state courts have jurisdiction over the probate of a non-Indian
who died domiciled in Indian Country with Indian heirs. Argu-
ably, state jurisdiction under those circumstances would interfere
with internal tribal affairs.
D. Tribal Water Rights
There are two aspects of civil jurisdiction over the reserved
water rights of Indians and Indian tribes: jurisdiction to adju-
dicate the right and jurisdiction to regulate or administer the
right.
1. Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
Adjudicatory jurisdiction in most instances has been vested in
state courts by virtue of the Act of July 10, 1952, 227 commonly
known as the McCarran Amendment. The McCarran Amend-
ment waived the sovereign immunity of the United States in any
suit "for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
system or other source." In United States v. District Court in
and for Eagle County,229 the Supreme Court held that this waiver
applied to federal non-Indian reserved water rights in a state
general stream adjudication. 0 Five years later the Court held
that the waiver in the McCarran Amendment also applies to
adjudications of Indian reserved water rights. 31
There are exceptions and limitations on the waiver of immunity
found in the McCarran Amendment. In the first place, the waiver
only applies to a "general stream adjudication." 2 There is no
waiver in state court for suits seeking to adjudicate only federal
or Indian reserved water rights.23 The Act requires that the rights
226. Id. at 222-23.
227. Pub. L. No. 495, 66 Stat. 549 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1986)).
228. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1988). The McCarran Amendment also waives the United
States' immunity for any suit "for the administration of such rights." Id. The extent of
that waiver has not been fully litigated or determined. See infra text accompanying notes
241-51.
229. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
230. Id. at 524-26.
231. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
232. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); In re Snake River Basin Water System,
764 P.2d 78 (Idaho 1988).
233. See Metropolitan Water Dist. v. United States, 830 F.2d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1987)
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of all claimants within the river system be joined for the United
States or a tribe to be subject to state court jurisdiction234
A federal court forum may be available for adjudication of
Indian-reserved water rights. However, there have been very few
instances where the United States has filed such federal court
actions. Also, the Supreme Court has made it clear that water
rights suits brought in federal court are subject to dismissal in
favor of concurrent comprehensive state adjudications.23"
A second limitation upon the McCarran Amendment's waiver
of immunity is extremely narrow and should not impact very
many cases. This concerns the "disclaimer clauses" found in
certain state Enabling Acts whereby, as a condition to admission
to t.he Union, the state disclaimed jurisdiction over the Indian
reservations within their state's possessive boundaries.236 The pres-
ence of these disclaimers represents a potential state law barrier
to adjudication of Indian-reserved water rights. In Arizona v.
San Carlos Apache Tribe, 37 the Court specifically addressed this
potential bar and entered two holdings. First, it held that "what-
ever limitation the Enabling Acts or federal policy may have
originally placed on state court jurisdiction over Indian water
rights, those limitations were removed by the McCarran Amend-
ment."'' 38 Thus, there is no federal bar to such suit. Second, the
Court held that, to the extent a bar to state jurisdiction is based
upon a disclaimer within a state constitution, "that is a question
of state law over which the state courts have binding author-
ity."' 39 In several recent cases, tribes have sought dismissal based
upon a state's alleged failure to amend its constitution to elim-
inate this disclaimer.3 However, none of these cases have been
successful.
In summary, the issue of adjudicatory jurisdiction has largely
been settled. In cases involving a general stream adjudication,
Indian reserved water rights will be adjudicated in state court
(finding that the McCarran amendment "does not authorize private suits to decide
priorities between the United States and particular claimants").
23.4. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618 (1963).
235. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
236. The states having disclaimers are Alabama, Arizona, Montana, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. F. CoHnn, supra note
1, at :168 n.175 (1982). Idaho and Wyoming, which were both admitted to statehood in
1890 without prior enabling acts, nevertheless inserted disclaimers in their state consti-
tution. See IDAno CoNsr. art. 21, § 19; Wyo .No CoNsT. art. 21, § 26.
23-1. 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
238. Id. at 564 (citations and footnote omitted).
239. Id. at 561.
240. See, e.g., In re Rights To Use Water In The Big Horn River, 750 P.2d 681,
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pursuant to the McCarran Amendment unless a related federal
court proceeding is well advanced when the state court proceeding
is initiated. However, a number of cases, involving less than all
of the users in a basin, will be adjudicated in federal court.
2. Regulatory Jurisdiction
A second issue concerns a tribe's jurisdiction to regulate water
rights and water use. A tribe's authority to regulate its own
members' water usage appears to be unquestioned. 24 To the
extent that the McCarran Amendment allows "administration"
by the state of adjudicated rights, the tribes may, however, be
subject to "incidental monitoring" by a state engineer. 242 That
supervision does not sanction actual administration by the state,
but only enforcement through the state court system under fed-
eral law.243
A tribe's authority to regulate non-Indians' use of non-tribal
water within the exterior boundaries of a reservation is far less
settled. The two leading cases from the Ninth Circuit reach
different conclusions. In Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation v. Walton,2" the Ninth Circuit held that state
regulation of the particular creek involved was preempted by the
creation of the Colville Indian Reservation. 245 In so holding, the
court emphasized that the creek involved was located entirely
within the reservation boundaries and use of water from the
creek would have no off-reservation impacts.2 "
Three years later, the Ninth Circuit reached a different con-
clusion in United States v. Anderson. 7 The court held that the
state possessed regulatory authority over non-tribal "excess wa-
ter" used by non-Indians within the water system that runs
through the reservation. The court found no preemption of state
law since there was no "direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security or the health or welfare of the Tribe." 2"
The Walton decision was distinguished on the basis that the
692-93 (Wyo. 1988) (reprinted at 753 P.2d 76); United States v. Superior Court, 144
Ariz. 265, 697 P.2d 658, 669 (1985).
241. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1416 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); F. CoHEN, supra note 1, at 604.
242. In re Big Horn River, 750 P.2d at 720.
243. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983).
244. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
245. Id. at 51.
246. Id. at 52-53.
247. 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
248. Id. at 1365.
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
356 AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 16
water system involved there was located totally within the res-
ervation boundaries, whereas in Anderson there was an impact
to off-reservation water users.
In the future the tribes may have difficulty in establishing
regulatory power over non-Indian water users, especially when
there may be off-reservation impacts. 249 The Anderson court
applied the test from Montana v. United States" 0 to this issue.
In a recent decision, four justices would add a gloss to the
Montana test, placing an even heavier burden upon tribes to




1. State Taxation of Tribes and Individual Indians in
Indian Country
State powers of taxation are severely limited in Indian Country,
particularly when Indian interests are affected. It has long been
settled that states have no authority to tax Indian trust property,
whether that property is held by individuals or the tribe, 2 It is
equally settled that the states have no power to tax non-trust
property held by Indians, when that property is located in Indian
Country. 3
Of course, Congress can authorize the states to tax Indian
trust and non-trust property located in Indian Country. However,
the Court will find the Indians' exemption from state taxes lifted
249. There are often off-reservation impacts since river systems are often hydrologi-
cally interconnected. See id. at 1366.
250. 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (finding that a tribe may regulate the activities of
non-Indians who enter consensual relationships with the tribe, or its members, or when
the non-Indian's conduct "threatens or has a direct effect on the political integrity,
economic security, or health and welfare of the tribe").
251. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
109 S. Ct. 2994, 3008 (1989) ("The impact [of non-Indian conduct on non-Indian land]
must be 'demonstrably serious' and must 'imperil' the political integrity, economic security
or the health and welfare of the tribe.").
252. See The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866) (state taxation of tribal
trust lands); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956) (state taxation of proceeds derived
from tribal trust lands).
253. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); supra text accompanying notes
133-35.
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only when "Congress has made its intention to [authorize state
taxation] unmistakably clear. ' ' - 4
In 1924 Congress authorized the states to tax Indians and
tribes royalty income from leases of Indian trust lands. 2 How-
ever, in a later statute the provision authorizing state taxation
was onitted.26 In Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians,2S7 the
Supreme Court found that Congress had impliedly rescinded the
states' authority to tax Indian royalty interests from trust land.218
Consequently, states may not tax Indian royalties from leases of
trust land entered into after 1938.
Recent litigation has focused on whether tribal Indian-owned
and individual Indian-owned fee land within a reservation is
subject to state property taxes. States argue that Congress au-
thorized state taxation of Indian-owned fee lands through section
6 of the General Allotment Act. Section 6 reads, in pertinent
part:
[The Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion,
and he is authorized, whenever he shall be satisfied
that any Indian allottee is competent and capable of
managing his or her own affairs at any time to cause
to be issued to such allottee a patent in fee simple,
and thereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance,
or taxation of said land shall be removed ... : Pro-
vided further, that until the issuance of fee-simple
patents all allottees to whom trust patents shall be
issued shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States.2s9
In Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Yak-
ima County,2° the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the states,
254. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 179 (1989) (quoting
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985)); see also California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 n.17 (1987) (stating that the Court
has adopted a per se rule prohibiting states from taxing Indian tribes and tribal members
within Indian Country absent Congressional authorization) (dictum); Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (stating "in the special area of state taxation,
absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no
satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities
carried on within the boundaries of the reservation").
255. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1924, 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1988).
256. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1988).
257. 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
258. Id. at 768.
259. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988).
260. 893 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1990).
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holding that section 6 contains the "unequivocal consent" re-
quired to find that Congress authorized state taxation of indi-
vidual Indian-owned fee land.261 The Associate Solicitor, Division
of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, and Attorneys
General of Idaho, North Dakota, and Oregon have reached a
different result,2 2 and the issue is likely to be litigated in other
circuits until the Supreme Court finally resolves it.
The Supreme Court held in the landmark decision of Mc-
Clanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission263 that states lack
the authority to tax the income of Indians earned in Indian
Country. Reading the relevant statutes and treaties in light of
the history of Indian sovereignty and self-government, the Court
ruled that the state's power to tax was preempted by federal law
and policy.2 4 In addition, the Court noted that it was very
difficult to see how the state could impose or collect its tax when
it lacked civil and criminal adjudicatory jurisdiction over Indians
in Indian Country.265
When McClanahan and earlier cases restricting state taxation
of Indians in Indian Country were decided, it was assumed that
the restriction prohibited the states from taxing any Indian in
Indian Country. However, in 1980 the Supreme Court distin-
guished between members of the tribe that govern a particular
reservation and other Indians not members of that tribe. In
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Res-
ervation,2" the Court authorized the state to impose its cigarette
and sales tax on sales made to non-member Indians in Indian
Country.6 7 The Court reasoned:
Federal statutes, even given the broadest reading to
which they are reasonably susceptible, cannot be said
to pre-empt Washington's power to impose its taxes
on Indians not members of the Tribe. We do not so
read the Major Crimes Act,. . . which at most provides
for federal-court jurisdiction over crimes committed by
261. Id. at 1044.
262. See Memorandum from Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs to Field Solicitor,
Twin Cities (April 21, 1989); Memorandum from David 0. High, (Idaho) Deputy Attorney
General to Paul Adams (March 31, 1982); 1985 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 37 (opinion no.
85-12); Letter from (Oregon) Assistant Attorney General Ted E. Barbera to James
Manary, Administrator, Assessment & Appraisal Division, Department of Revenue (Mar.
14, 1983).
263. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
2,55. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174-75.
256. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
Z57. Id. at 159.
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Indians on another Tribe's reservation... Similarly,
the mere fact that nonmembers resident on the reser-
vation come within the definition of "Indian" for
purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934...
does not demonstrate a congressional intent to exempt
such Indians from state taxation.
Nor would the imposition of Washington's tax on
these purchasers contravene the principle of tribal self-
government, for the simple reason that nonmembers
are not constituents of the governing Tribe. For most
practical purposes those Indians stand on the same
footing as non-Indians resident on the reservation. 6
In Colville, the state had a particularly great interest in im-
posing its sales and cigarette taxes. The state was trying to
overcome a "magnet" effect, which was drawing purchasers to
Indian Country to buy cigarettes and other goods free of state
taxes. The Colville ruling may be limited to that situation. If the
language quoted above is read expansively, states may have the
power to levy taxes on the income and nontrust property of
nonmember Indians in Indian Country, as long as those taxes
do not interfere with the self-government of the resident tribe.
Since Public Law 280 does not authorize the states to tax
Indian owned property located in Indian Country,269 the rules
established in the cases discussed above apply throughout Indian
Country.
2. State Taxation of Tribes and Individual Indians Outside
Indian Country
It is equally settled law that Indians and Indian property
located outside Indian Country are "subject to nondiscriminatory
state law [including state tax laws]" absent express federal law
to the contrary. 20 Even an Indian tribe is subject to state taxation
as to business activities operated outside of Indian Country.271
268. Id. at 160-61.
269. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (striking down a state tax levied
on a tribal member's personal property located on trust land within a Public Law 280
reservation).
270. See Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575 (1928) (upholding a state
tax imposed on off-reservation individual Indian land purchased with the accumulated
royalties from an individual Indian's restricted allotted lands).
271. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973) (upholding
nondiscriminatory state gross receipts tax imposed on income earned by a tribal enterprise
located outside Indian Country). No instance has been found where a state attempted to
tax the governmental activities of a tribe outside Indian Country; it is likely that the
federal guardianship of tribes would preclude a tax of that sort. See 1980 Iowa Rep.
Att'y Gen. 693 (opinion no. 80-5-2).
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Where state taxes are applied to Indian activities occurring
both on and off a reservation, the incidence of the state tax
must be examined to determine whether the state is taxing on-
or off-reservation activity.272 When the taxing event occurs on-
reservation, a state tax may not be imposed on Indians or Indian
property. For example, in Moe v. Confederated Salish & Ko-
otenai Tribes,27 3 the Supreme Court disallowed a state personal
property tax on vehicles owned by reservation Indians although
the vehicles were driven outside the reservation. 274 The district
court had found that the state tax was based on the principal
location of the vehicle, not on highway use, and that the state
had not sought to tax vehicles, other than those owned by
reservation Indians, on the basis of highway use. 275
A number of tribes retain federally protected rights to hunt,
fish, or gather plants free of state regulation outside Indian
Country.27 6 In Tulee v. Washington,277 the Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction of an Indian for fishing without a license,
holding that the treaty right to fish outside the reservation "fore-
closes the state from charging the Indians a fee .... [I]t acts
upon the Indians as a charge for exercising the very right their
ancestors intended to reserve." 27 The rationale of Tulee appears
272. An Indian residing within a reservation, but earning income off the reservation,
can be taxed to the extent of the off-reservation income, provided that the state bases
its ino:me tax on place of earning. Similarly, an Indian residing off a reservation, but
earning income on the reservation, can be taxed for income earned on the reservation,
provided that the state bases its income tax on residence. Dillon v. Montana, 451 F.
Supp. 168, 173-74 (D. Mont. 1978). However, the state's authority to tax can be preempted
as to specific sources of income. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1956)
(exempting from federal taxation income derived directly from restricted Indian allot-
ments).
273. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
274. Id. at 480-81.
275. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Montana, 392 F. Supp. 1325, 1327
(D. Mont. 1975) (three-judge court), affd sub nom. Moe v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenal Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
276. E.g., Treaty with the Yakimas, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951, 953 (reserving to the
Indian,; the "right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with
citizens: of the Territory"); Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132, 1133
(reserving "the privilege of hunting ... on open and unclaimed lands"); Treaty with
the Eastern Band of Shoshone and Bannock, July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 673, 674 (reserving
"the right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may
be found thereon, and so long as peace subsists among the whites and the Indians on
the borders of the hunting districts"); Treaty with the Ottawas, Mar. 28, 1836, 7 Stat.
491, 495 (reserving the "right of hunting on the lands, ceded with other usual privileges
of occupancy").
277. 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
278. Id. at 684-85.
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to preclude any direct state taxes on the exercise of treaty reserved
or similar rights to hunt, fish, or gather outside Indian Coun-
try.279
3. State Taxation of Non-Indians in Indian Country
The states have long been authorized to impose their taxes on
the property of non-Indians located within Indian Country.U0 A
state has been allowed to impose a possessory interest tax on
non-Indian lessees of Indian trust lands, even though the effect
- may be to reduce the amount of rental the Indians are able to
obtain for their land.u1 The states may also tax the income of
non-Indians earned on an Indian reservation. 2
Despite these general rules, there are important limitations on
the authority of states to levy taxes on non-Indians in Indian
Country. Primarily, states may not tax when the subject matter
is preempted by federal law.
Federal law generally preempts state taxation of non-Indians
in Indian Country in one of two circumstances. First, a state tax
may be preempted because it interferes with the regulatory ac-
tivities of the federal government. Second, and more common,
a state tax may be preempted because, although imposed on
non-Indians, it indirectly affects a tribe in such a manner as to
frustrate federal policies of tribal self-determination.
In Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Commission,283
the Supreme Court held that Arizona could not tax the gross
receipts of a non-Indian trader doing business on the Navajo
Reservation.2 4 The Court noted that Indian traders must be
licensed by the federal government and are subject to extensive
federal regulation. The Court ruled that these regulations gov-
erned the business of Indian trading "so fully ... that no room
remains for state laws imposing additional burdens upon trad-
ers."2 5
279. See also Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (tribes have a reserved right to take fish at usual and
accustomed places free of state regulation except as necessary for conservation of the
fishery).
280. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898); Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28
(1885).
281. See Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 643 F.2d 1253 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977); Aqua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v.
County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972).
282. Kahn v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 16 Ariz. App. 17, 490 P.2d 846 (1971),
appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 941 (1973).
283. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
284. Id. at 690.
285. Id.
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The Court expanded its rule in the case of Central Machinery
v. Arizona State Tax Commission.2 6 There, the state sought to
impose its gross receipts tax on a non-Indian whose permanent
place of business was outside Indian Country and who was not
a federally licensed trader. However, the sale was of machinery,
which was to be delivered to the tribe in Indian Country, and
federal statutes did apply to the sale. The Court found the state
taxes were preempted by federal regulations that govern trading
with Indians in Indian Country.28
More recently, the Supreme Court has invalidated state taxes
imposed on non-Indian contractors engaged in sales or services
to tribes in Indian Country. In White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker,28 8 the Court struck down state motor carrier license
and fuel use taxes imposed on a non-Indian who had contracted
to cut timber on the reservation and deliver it to the tribal
sawmill. The Court held the taxes were preempted by extensive
regulations that apply to timber operations in Indian Country.29
Similarly, in Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Reve-
nue,-9° the Court struck down a gross receipts tax imposed on a
non-Indian contractor who had been hired by an Indian school
board to build a school on the reservation. In striking down the
taxes, the Court noted that comprehensive federal regulations
govern Indian education and that the state had abdicated all
responsibility for educating the tribe's students. 291
In each of the preemption cases the Court has clearly estab-
lished that preemption does not require an express congressional
declaration invalidating state taxes. The Court has observed that
"[t]he unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it
generally unhelpful to apply to federal enactments regulating
Indian tribes those standards of preemption that have emerged
in other areas of the law. ' 292 Rather, the Court has stated that
traditional notions of tribal sovereignty, as well as federal policies
favoring tribal self-development, must inform the preemption
analysis. "As a result, ambiguities in federal law should be
construed generously, and federal pre-emption is not limited to
those situations where Congress has explicitly announced an
intenion to preempt state activity.' '293
286. 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
287. Id. at 165-66.
288. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
289. Id. at 151.
290. 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
291. Id. at 841-42.
292. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143.
293. 458 U.S. at 838.
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The Supreme Court has progressed even further by permitting
state taxation of cigarettes that are sold in Indian Country. In
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,294 the Supreme
Court held that a state excise tax could be imposed on cigarette
sales by an Indian to a non-Indian in Indian Country when the
legal incidence of the tax fell on the non-Indian purchaser.295
The Court also permitted the state to apply its law requiring the
Indian seller to collect the tax and remit it to state authorities.
The rule of Moe was extended in Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation.296 There, the Court
held that sales by a tribal organization to non-Indians and non-
member Indians were taxable by the state, but that sales to tribal
members were not. 297 The state could require the tribal organi-
zation to affix state tax stamps to packages of cigarettes and to
keep records of exempt and non-exempt sales. None of these
provisions were found to interfere with tribal self-government or
to be federally preempted, although the tribe imposed its own
tax on sales of cigarettes. 298 The Court reasoned that:
The principle of tribal self-government ... seeks an
accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and
the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those
of the State, on the other. While the Tribes do have
an interest in raising revenues for essential govern-
mental programs, that interest is strongest when the
revenues are derived from value generated on the res-
ervation by activities involving the Tribes and when
the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services. The State
also has a legitimate governmental interest in raising
revenues, and that interest is likewise strongest when
the tax is directed at off-reservation value and when
the taxpayer is the recipient of state services. 299
In upholding the imposition of the state tax on sales to non-
Indians, the Court found Washington's interest in preventing the
tribe from "marketing [its] tax exemption to nonmembers who
do not receive significant tribal services" to be greater than the
tribe's interest in raising revenues. 300 However, the Court did
294. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
295. Id. at 483.
296. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
297. Id. at 160.
298. Id. at 156.
299. Id. at 156-57 (citation omitted).
300. Id. at 157.
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 16
suggest that a state tax stacked upon a tribal tax might be struck
down as an interference with tribal self-government if the tribal
tax had a regulatory purpose that was hindered by the state
tax 0
1
There is no direct conflict between the state and tribal
schemes, since each government is free to impose its
taxes without ousting the other. Although taxes can be
used for distributive or regulatory purposes, as well as
for raising revenue, we see no nonrevenue purposes to
the tribal taxes at issue in these cases .... 302
Many relied on the language quoted above to predict that the
Supreme Court would invalidate state severance taxes that were
levied on minerals produced in Indian Country, if those minerals
were also subject to a tribal severance tax. 03 Unlike the cigarettes
at issue in Colville, tribal minerals are "value generated on the
reservation." 304 Similarly, the federal government imposes com-
prehensive regulations governing Indian mineral production. Nev-
ertheless, when presented with the issue, the Court ruled against
the tribes, at least where (1) dual taxation has not hindered the
tribe's ability to collect or impose higher taxes; (2) state taxation
has not deterred production from tribal lands; (3) the economic
burden of the state tax does not fall on the tribe; and (4) the
state has not completely abdicated responsibility for on-reserva-
tion mineral development. 0 5
B. Tribal Taxation
Although taxation is one of the most basic powers of self-
government, tribes have only recently begun to exercise the power.
Because of traditional Indian hostility to taxation and the in-
credibly high incidence of poverty in Indian Country, few tribal
taxes are aimed at the member population. Rather, most tribal
taxes are directed towards non-Indian businesses conducted in
Indian Country.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the tribes may tax
non-]Indians. In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Col-
ville Indian Reservation, °0 the Court upheld the imposition of a
301. Id.
302. Id. at 158.
303. E.g., C. WILKINSON, supra note 111, at 98.
304. Colville, 447 U.S. at 156-57.
305. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
306. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
364
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tribal cigarette tax on non-Indian purchasers. 17 Colville also
indicated that a legitimate tribal tax is not preempted by a state
tax on the same subject matter: "[E]ven if the State's interests
were implicated by the tribal taxes ... it must be remembered
that tribal sovereignty is dependent on and subordinate to only
the Federal Government, not the States."308
The Court's broad view of tribal taxing power was confirmed
in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.?9 There, the Court upheld
a tribal severance tax applied to non-Indian lessees who mined
oil and gas on the reservations. 10 The lessees had argued that
the tribal power to tax was based solely upon the tribe's right
to exclude nonmembers from the reservation, and that the power
could not be exercised against lessees whose leases conferred a
right of entry.31" ' The Supreme Court held that the power of
exclusion was sufficiently broad to support the tax, but also
rejected the lessees' limited view of the nature of the tribe's
power to tax. "The power does not derive solely from the Indian
tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands. Instead,
it derives from the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to
control economic activity within its jurisdiction, and to defray
the cost of providing governmental services. 312
The Jicarilla Apache Tribe's constitution required the approval
of the Secretary of the Interior to adopt a tax.3 3 However, there
is no law requiring secretarial approval in order for a tribal tax
to be effective. In Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe,1 4 the
Supreme Court ruled that tribes which have no internal require-
ment of secretarial approval may impose a possessory interest
and business activity tax on conduct occurring in Indian Country
without involvement of the Department of the Interior.31 5
X. Regulatory Jurisdiction
A. General Regulatory Authority
1. Tribal Regulatory Authority
Tribes have the exclusive authority to regulate Indian and non-
Indian conduct occurring on trust land in Indian Country. Tribes
307. Id. at 156.
308. Id. at 154.
309. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
310. Id. at 137.
311. Id. at 137-38.
312. Id. at 137.
313. Id. at 155.
314. 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
315. Id. at 200.
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also have the authority to regulate members' conduct off-reser-
vation when important tribal interests are involved. For example,
a tribe may regulate off-reservation treaty fishing rights exercised
by -its members.3 16 In a case arising out of the Navajo-Hopi land
dispute, the Navajo Nation was held to have authority to order
its members to remove structures they had built on Hopi lands.317
The tribes also have substantial authority to regulate non-
Indians engaged in activity in Indian Country. In Montana v.
United States,318 the Court proposed two tests to determine when
a tribe may retain its authority over the conduct of non-Indians
on lands within a reservation. First, "[a] tribe may regulate,
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe
or its members, through commercial dealings, contracts, leases,
or other arrangements. 3 1 9 Second, a tribe "retains inherent
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians
on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens
or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health and welfare of the tribe." 31°
2. State Regulatory Authority
The question of state authority to regulate in Indian Country
is generally approached in the same manner as questions of state
power to tax, i.e., state regulatory power is preempted when it
"interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests
reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are
sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority.' '32 The
Supreme Court has held that even when a state has asserted civil
jurisdiction over Indian Country under Public Law 280, the state
lacks authority to regulate a tribal member's conduct on trust
property. 32" The Court suggested that tribal governments were
316. See Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974).
317. Sidney v. Zah, 718 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1983).
318. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
319. Id. at 565. This test was used to uphold a tribe's authority to regulate on-
reservation repossession of motor vehicles by off-reservation dealers. See Babbitt Ford,
Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 592-94 (9th Cir. 1983).
320. 450 U.S. at 566. This test was used to uphold the tribe's authority to regulate
non-Indian conduct occurring on fee land within a reservation. See Cardin v. De La
Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982); Knight v. Shoshone
& Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982). But see Brendale v. Confed-
erated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); infra text accompanying
notes 325-26.
321. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983).
322. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); supra text accompanying notes
126-41.
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likely to be destroyed "if tribal governments and reservation
Indians were subordinated to the full panoply of civil regulatory
powers ... of state and local governments. ' ' 323 Thus, even in
Public Law 280 states, the tribes retain the exclusive authority
to regulate conduct on trust land.
Until very recently, it was assumed that the Montana tests324
severely limited the states' power to regulate non-Indian activities
occurring in Indian Country. However, in Brendale v. Confed-
erated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation,32- the Court upheld
the state's authority to zone non-Indian fee land within a res-
ervation in certain circumstances. 32
Brendale concerned the tribe's and Yakima county's attempts
to zone two parcels of fee land located within the Yakima Indian
Reservation. The tribes' zoning regulations were somewhat more
restrictive than the county's, in terms of the parcels usages. One
parcel was situated in an area of the reservation that had been
"closed" to the public at least since 1972 to protect its wilderness
values, which included religious and cultural significance to the
tribes. Only three percent of the land in the "closed" area was
owned in fee. The second parcel was located near the northern
boundary of the reservation, in an area where half the land was
owned in fee and half held in trust. The area in which the second
parcel was situated had never been closed to the public and was
referred to as the "open" area. In three separate opinions, each
applying a different analysis,327 the Court concluded that the
323. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 388.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 318-20.
325. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
326. Id. at 448.
327. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy,
concluded that tribes lack the inherent authority to zone nonmember fee land. The four
would require tribes to pursue state remedies to stop a use which impacts tribal interests
and, failing to obtain relief through state administrative procedures, to file an action in
federal court to enjoin the non-Indian's use of land. A federal court could enjoin
"demonstrably serious" conduct that "imperils" tribal interests. Id. at 421-33.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice O'Connor, concluded that tribes have the inherent
authority to regulate non-Indians' conduct within the reservation. However, they found
that power to be diminished because tribes cannot deny a non-Indian landowner access
to his property. They held that, where large numbers of non-Indians have settled in an
area of the reservation, the tribe has lost the power to define the "essential character"
of the area and the concomitant power to regulate non-Indian conduct in the area. Id.
at 438-47.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, determined that tribes
possess the inherent power as sovereigns to regulate on-reservation, non-Indian conduct
when that conduct threatens or has a direct effect on the tribe's economic security, health
and welfare, or political integrity. Since they also conclude that there is no power more
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
368 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
tribes had exclusive authority to regulate land use in the "closed"
area, but that the county could regulate uses of fee land in the
"open" area.
The opening to state power to regulate conduct in Indian
Country created by Brendale may widen. States may be able to
regulate nonmember Indians to the same extent as they are
permitted to regulate non-Indians in Indian Country.32
B. Hunting, Fishing and Gathering Rights
Probably no issue has generated more conflict between Indians
and non-Indians than disputes centering on the tribes' exercise
of their treaty-reserved rights to hunt, fish, and gather on, and
ofte:a off, their reservations.
1. On-Reservation Rights
It is well settled that the establishment of a reservation by
treaty, statute, agreement, or executive order includes an implied
right of Indians to hunt, fish, and gather on that reservation
free 'of state regulation. 329 The Indians' immunity from state
regulation applies even in states that have asserted civil and/or
criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country by Public Law 280.
That statute provides that it shall not "deprive any Indian or
any Indian tribe, band or community of any right, privilege, or
immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute
with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control,
licensing, or regulation thereof.''330
The tribes have the authority to regulate Indian hunting and
fishing on their reservations. 3' In addition, under the federal
government's plenary power over Indian affairs, the Secretary
of the Interior may issue regulations governing Indian hunting
and/or fishing, and has done so on a few reservations.332
central to maintaining the economic security and health and welfare of a tribe than the
power to regulate land use, the three Justices would permit tribes to zone Indian and
non-Indian fee land within a reservation under any circumstances. Id. at 448-68 (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
328. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 161 (1980) (finding "[flor
mot practical purposes [nonmember] Indians stand on the same footing as non-Indians
resident on the reservation.").
329. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Leech Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Minn. 1971).
330. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1988).
331. United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979).
332. See 25 C.F.R. § 241 (1988) (fishing on the Annette Islands Reserve); id. § 244
(hunting on the Wind River Indian Reservation); id. § 250 (fishing on the Hoopa Valley
Reservation).
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The tribes also have the authority to regulate hunting and
fishing on trust or tribal-owned land within the reservation, at
least where the animal or fish resource does not migrate off the
reservation.333 State laws that are inconsistent with tribal regu-
lations are preempted in these circumstances. 334 The tribes may
regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian land
within a reservation, only if the non-Indian's conduct "threatens
or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health and welfare of the tribe. 33 5
The implied treaty right to hunt and fish free from state law
is not extinguished merely by congressional termination of the
trust relationship between a tribe and the federal government.
Rather, Congress must clearly indicate an intent to extinguish
hunting and fishing rights. 336
2. Off-Reservation Rights
In addition to impliedly reserving the Indians' right to hunt,
fish, and gather on a reservation, a treaty may expressly reserve
the Indians' right to hunt, fish, and gather off the reservation. 337
Where a treaty reserves the right to fish at "all usual and
accustomed places," the state may not interfere with Indians'
access to those places 33 8 nor may it require a license fee from
Indians to fish there. A tribal member who exercises the treaty
right to hunt on "open and unclaimed" lands within his tribe's
aboriginal territory, but outside of its reservation, or on ceded
lands "in common with all other persons" is not subject to state
limitations on hunting season. 339
However, the state may impose regulations that are essential
to conservation of animal and fish species 34 provided the state
can demonstrate that its regulation is a "reasonable and necessary
conservation measure,... and that its application to the Indians
is necessary in the interests of conservation. ' 34' Further, the state
333. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
334. Id. at 344.
335. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
336. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); United States v. Felter,
752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985). Congress abrogated the treaty right to hunt eagles through
enactment of the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1988). See also United States
v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
337. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
338. Id. at 381-82.
339. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 206 (1975); State v. Sasso, 172 Mont.
242, 563 P.2d 562, 564-65 (1977).
340. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game (Puyallup 1), 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968).
341. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975) (emphasis in original).
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regulations must not discriminate against Indian fishing or hunt-
ing. 342
Where a tribe cedes title to lands without indicating an intent
to retain hunting and fishing rights there, the state may regulate
Indians on the ceded lands.143 Of course, absent treaty rights,
Indians outside of Indian Country are subject to the same state
laws as any other hunter, fisher, or gatherer.3
C. Liquor Regulation
Control of liquor has historically been one of the most com-
prehensive federal activities in Indian affairs. However, under
18 U.S.C. § 1161, liquor transactions in Indian Country are no
longer subject to federal prohibitions "provided such act or
transaction is in conformity both with the laws of the State in
which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly
adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction. '345
In United States v. Mazurie,346 the Supreme Court sustained
the conviction of two non-Indians who sold liquor in Indian
Country without the tribal permission required by section 1161.147
In Rice v. Rehner,314 the Court held that a state could require a
state license from a tribal member who sold liquor on-reservation
pursuant to a license issued from the tribe. The Court's rationale
was based in part upon section 1161.349 The Mazurie and Rice
decisions reflect that if a tribe permits the sale of liquor in Indian
Country, the tribe's regulations governing such sales must be at
least as restrictive as the state's laws and a tribal licensee must
also comply with state licensing laws.
D. Gaming Regulation
The Court's decision in Rice has not been extended to permit
state regulation of other nontraditional activities now conducted
342. Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398. See also Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe,
Inc., 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (finding that limiting steelhead fishing to hook-and-line had the
effect of granting the entire run to non-Indian sports fishermen, in violation of the non-
discriminatory standard specified in Puyallup 1).
34.3. Oregon Dep't of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985).
344. But see Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Alaska 1979) (the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988), prohibits the state from prosecuting
an Indian for taking a moose out of season when the moose is central to an Indian
funeral potlatch).
34.5. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1988).
346. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
34.7. Id. at 553.
348. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
349. Id. at 733-34.
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or licensed by tribes. In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians,5 0 the Court held that the state was preempted from
applying its regulatory gaming laws to Indian Country.351 Al-
though it rejected any per se rule that state law could not apply
to tribal operations, the Court held that federal and tribal inter-
ests in tribal self-government and self-sufficiency outweighed any
state interest in discouraging organized crime.352 Tribal regula-
tions governing gaming activities in Indian Country must now
comply with the Federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act . 53
E. Federal Environmental Laws
During the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted a number of
laws designed to preserve and improve the natural environment.
Often, states were given authority to implement the federal en-
vironmental statutes. While many of the early federal acts granted
tribes the status of "municipalities," the laws overlooked the
possibility that tribes would resist state attempts to regulate the
environment in Indian Country and would, instead, seek to assert
their own sovereign authority over reservation lands.
As tribes increasingly asserted governmental authority over
Indian Country, disputes predictably arose concerning the power
of states to impose their regulations, designed to implement
federal environmental law, in Indian Country. Congress re-
sponded to these disputes with amendments that provide the
tribes with the opportunity to assume a role in implementing
federal environmental laws in Indian Country that is comparable
to the states' role outside Indian Country.
1. Safe Drinking Water Act 4
Enacted in 1974, the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) estab-
lished a federal regulatory system to ensure the safety of public
drinking water systems.5 5 Under the Act the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) sets maximum permissible levels for con-
taminants in drinking water. 356 The states are designated as having
primary enforcement responsibility for ensuring that public water
350. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
351. For a discussion of the distinction the Court drew between criminal laws pro-
hibiting certain conduct, and civil laws regulating conduct, see supra text accompanying
notes 139-41.
352. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 220-22.
353. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
354. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-11 (1988).
355. Id. § 300f(4).
356. Id. § 300g-5.
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systems meet or exceed the standards established by EPA.35 In
addition, each state must establish an EPA-approved under-
ground injection control (UIC) program, designed to prevent the
endangerment of underground drinking water sources.358 The UIC
program regulations set injection well specifications and regulate
radioactive and hazardous waste disposal wells, industrial and
municipal wells within one-quarter mile of an underground drink-
ing water source, oil and natural gas recovery wells, and wells
for the extraction of minerals and geothermal energy.3 59
In 1986 Congress amended the SDWA to allow tribes to be
treated as states for SDWA programs.36 The EPA is authorized
to delegate to tribes primary enforcement responsibility for public
water systems and for underground injection control programs
in Indian Country. 361 However, the programs operated by the
tribes may not be "less protective of the health of persons" than
the programs operated by a state.3 62
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act 63
Despite the federal government's traditional interest in pro-
tecting navigation before World War II, the federal government's
role in water pollution control was limited to special problems,
such as refuse discharged into navigable waters and oil spills. 36
Beginning with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948,
the federal government's role gradually expanded. In 1965 the
Water Quality Act365 required all states to enact water quality
standards for interstate navigable waters and provided for a
cumbersome enforcement process in which judicial action was a
last resort.
In 1972 Congress concluded that the water quality approach
embodied in the Water Quality Act was not working. When
enacting the Clean Water Act of 1972 (CWA), Congress departed
357. Id. § 300g-2.
358. Id. § 300h.
359. 40 C.F.R. § 122.32 (1988).
360. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11 (1988).
361. Id.
362. Id. § 300j-ll(b)(2).
363. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988) (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act).
364. See, e.g., id. § 407 (prohibiting the discharge of "any refuse matter of any kind
or description whatever, other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state" without a permit from the Secretary of the Army); United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 226-29 (1966) (refuse includes valuable
substances as well as valueless substances discharged into navigable waters even when
navigable capacity is not threatened).
365. Act of Oct. 2, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903.
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from earlier legislation by giving the federal government the
primary role of setting water pollution policy and giving states
the role of agents implementing federal policy.36
Under the CWA the states are given the opportunity to estab-
lish standards for the discharge of toxic pollutants into a surface
water source. The standards must be based upon the existing or
designated uses of the water source, e.g., public water supply,
fish and wildlife propagation, recreation, agricultural, industrial,
or navigation. The EPA reviews state water quality standards to
determine whether those standards comply with the CWA re-
quirements and do not interfere with the attainment of water
quality standards in another state. 67 States are also given an
opportunity to certify that discharges into a surface water source
do not violate the state's or a downstream water quality stan-
dard.3 6s
Pursuant to 1987 amendments, the EPA may treat tribes as
states for a variety of purposes,3 69 perhaps the most important
of which are establishing water quality standards and certifying
that discharges do not violate the tribe's or downstream stan-
dards. The amendments specifically authorize tribal programs to
be administered on all land within the boundaries of a reserva-
tion,37 0 including non-trust and non-Indian land. By virtue of the
amendments, tribes are eligible to control the quality of surface
water located on or flowing through a reservation, subject only
to federal water pollution control policy.
3. Clean Air Act37'
The basic framework of the Clean Air Act (CAA) calls for
the federal government to establish regulatory standards and for
the states to implement those standards. The Act provides for
several programs to "protect and enhance the quality of the
366. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1988).
367. Id. § 1313.
368. Id. § 1341.
369. The Clean Water Act permits tribes to be treated as states for purposes of, inter
alia: grants for pollution control programs under id. § 1256; grants for construction of
treatment works under id. §§ 1281-1299; water quality standards and implementation
plans under id. § 1313; enforcement of water quality standards under id. § 1319; clean
lakes programs under id. § 1324; certification of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permits under id. § 1341; issuance of NPDES permits under id. § 1342;
and issuance of permits for dredge or fill material under id. § 1344. See also id. § 1377(a)
(applying policy to Indian tribes).
370. Id. § 1377(e)(2).
371. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7400-7642 (1988).
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Nation's air resources, ' 372 one of which is designed to prevent
the significant deterioration of air resources in various air quality
control regions.
Congress designated the air quality control regions in each
state as either "class I" or "class II" areas. 37s The designation
of n area as class I or class II has important consequences, as
the Act limits increases in concentrations of sulfur oxide, partic-
ulate matter, and other applicable pollutants in each area. Greater
air quality degradation is permitted in class II areas than in class
I areas.
The states were authorized to redesignate class II areas as class
I areas. 374 In 1977, Congress amended the Act to grant tribes the
exclusive authority to redesignate all lands within the exterior
boundaries of their reservations.3 75
4. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act376
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FI-
FRA) authorizes states to assume responsibility for certifying
persons who apply pesticides that are registered under the Act.3 77
Although no similar statutory authorization exists for tribes, EPA
issued regulations in 1975 that permit tribes to assume respon-
sibility for certifying applicators. 378
5. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act3 79
Finally, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
authorizes the states to establish hazardous waste management
programs "in lieu of" the federal program administered by EPA
that would otherwise apply.3 80 In Washington Department of
Ecology v. EPA,38' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded
that, given the general rule which precludes states from exercising
jurisdiction over Indians in Indian Country unless Congress has
372. Id. § 7401.
373. Id. § 7472.
374. Id. § 7474.
375. Id. § 7474(c). See also Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1981) (the
EPA had the authority to approve a tribe's request to redesignate its reservation as class
I befcre the effective date of the 1977 amendments, notwithstanding § 107(a) of the Act,
which delegated to the states responsibility "for assuring air quality within the entire
geographic area comprising the state").
375. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
377. Id. § 136(a)(2).
37.3. 40 C.F.R. § 171.10 (1988).
379. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1988).
380. Id. § 6926.
381. 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
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clearly expressed an intention to the contrary,382 the EPA could
decline to grant a state primary enforcement responsibility over
Indian lands within a state's borders. The Court reasoned:
[TIhe EPA, having retained regulatory authority over
Indian lands in Washington... can promote the abil-
ity of the tribes to govern themselves by allowing them
to participate in hazardous waste management. To do
so, it need not delegate its full authority to the tribes...
It is enough that EPA remains free to carry out its
policy of encouraging tribal self-government by con-
sulting with the tribes over matters of hazardous waste
policy. 383
The Court's decision makes it clear that a federal agency may
defer to tribal authority, to the exclusion of the states, for
enforcement of federal environmental laws in Indian Country.
382. Id. at 1469.
383. Id. at 1472.
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